The trade disputes and trade unions bill of 1927 by Tabor, Katherine
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1928
The trade disputes and trade
unions bill of 1927
Tabor, Katherine
Boston University
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/7313
Boston University

(UolUge of SJtherai Aria
iEibrari)
The Gift of G^xNNvq'C
,
Ideal
Double Reversible
Manuscript Cover.
Patented Nov. 15. 1898
Manufactured by
Adams, (lushing 4 Foster
28-6^2
SOSTOli UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Thesis
THE TRADE DISPUTES AND TR A.DE UfllCKS BILL OF 1927
Submitted by
Katherine Tabor
(A. 3., Boston University, 1925)
In partial fulfilment of requirements
for tne degree of Master of Arts
COLLEGE Of LIBERAL ART*
LIBRARY
' S 2 Q
7^U| } <\
'hi *5 3 5
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/thetradedisputesOOtabo
"57 e.744
.'30
±
Brief history of rise of trade-unionism since 1870 copxj \
OUT LINE
A. Legal recognition Page
1. Act of 1871 2
2. Acts of 1875-76 7
B. Growth of political power
1. Representation in Parliament 8
2. Relation of trade-unionism to Labor Party 13
C. Financial Security
1. Taff Vale Decision (1901) 15
2. Trade Disputes Act (1906) 17
3. Osborne Judgment (1908) 18
4. ^raie Union Act (1913) 19
II. Precipitating causes of Trade Disputes and Trade
Unions Bill
A. Goal strike
1. Condition of mining industry previous to
granting of subsidy 20
2. Subsidy
a. Why granted 24
b. Effects 25
3. Eeport of Coal Commission
a. Main features 26
b. effect of Report 26

B. General Strike Page
1. Cause 28
2. Aim 29
3. Extent 30
4. Duration 30
5. "Results 30
6. Question of legality 30
a. Opinion of Sir Jo 'in Simon 31
b. The Astbnry Judgment 32
c. Opinion of Sir Senrj Slesser 33
C. Condition of capital and labor at commencement
of Parliamentary session of 1927
1. Failure of miners' strike 34
2. Condition of trade unions 34
3. Attitude of mine owners 35
III. Parliamentary history of Trade Disoutes and Trade
Unions Bill
A. Origin
1. Scarborough Conference 36
2. Changed attitude of ialdwin 36
3. Failure to consult Labor leaders 37
4. The King's Speech 37
(J
3. Brief summary of history of aill in the House of Commons Page
1. Publication of text of Bill 38
2. Second reading
a. Speech of the Attorney-General 39
b. Principal speeches in debate on second reading
(1) Clynes 46
(2) Harney 47
(3) Slesser 47
(4) Hose 48
(5) Simon 49
(6) Baldwin 49
(7) Snowden 50
(
q
) Lloyd Oeorere 51
c. Vote on second reading 51
3. Committee stage
a. Adoption of closure ruling 52
b. liature of amendments proposed by Labor and
Liberal members 53
c. government amendments adopted 54
4. Third Heading 57

C. Principal points at issue Page
1. Declaratory nature of Clause 1, Suo-section (1) 59
2. Type of strike made illegal by Clause 1 62
3. Extent to which Clause 3 would interfere witn the
conduct of strikes 66
4. Sffect of Clause 4 7
(Political Levy) 70
D. The Bill in the House of Lords
IV. Some conclusions drawn from a study of the Bill
A* necessity of certain clauses doubtful
1. Clauses 1 and 2 74
2. Clause 3 75
3. Clause 4 75
B. Definitions open to misinterpretation
1. Illegal strike 77
2. Intimidation 77
C. Possibility of regarding lae Bill as a declaration of
class war
1. Failure to invite co-operation of Labor leaders 79
2. Conditions under wnicn tne Bill was introduced 79
3. Particular clauses considered indicative of class
hostility 79
4. Industrial peace threatened by tnis interpretation
of the Bill 80

Summary
Bibliography
Appendix
Text of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill (a
amended in Committee and on Peport), June 22, 1927

1In tne course of the debate in the House of Commons on the Trade
Disputes and Trade Unions Bill of 1927 a member representing the Labor
Party said: "No more important event which so vitally affects the in-
dustrial life of tae nation has taken place during the last 100 years.
. ... If this Bill were given its proper title it mignt be described
as a Bill for the repeal of all the trade union legislation passed
1
since 1824. n
While this is putting tne case somewhat too strongly, it is never-
theless true that the Bill was designed to make several important
alterations in the existing laws and to modify the status of the trade
unions
•
To gain an adequate comprenension of the importance of tne Bill in
tne history of the trade-unionism, it will be necessary to survey brief-
ly the steps by whicn tne trade unions gained the degree of political
power and legal and financial privileges wnich they enjoyed at the time
of the introduction of the 1927 Bill.
Tne history of trade-unionism since 1870 has been characterized
in general by a series of legislative acts increasing the freedom and
security of the unions, by a growth of political power, and by several
unfavorable judicial decisions later reversed by legislation.
1. The parliamentary Debates: Official Report. Fifth Series - Vol. 205,
Column 15 79

2I. Brief history of the rise of trade-unionism since 1970
A. Legal recognition
1. Act of 1371
During the decade preceding the Act of 1871, which first gave
legal recognition to trade-unionism, the unions had grown rapidly
both in membership and in wealth. The formation of great amalgamated
societies indicated the increasing scope of the trade union movement;
wnile the appearance of Trades Councils, uniting local unions and
branches, foresnadowed the attempt to form a united labor movement which
1
should include all trades.
Many of the trade unions, lacking legal recognition, took advantage
of the Friendly Societies Act (1355) wnich "allowed societies establish-
ed for any purpose not illegal to deposit their rules with the Registrar
of Friendly Societies and nave disputes among their own members dealt
2
with summarily by the magistrates." The unions did this in the be-
lief that it would afford them a means of protection against a member
who used their funds wrongfully. In a case brought by the Boiler-
makers' Society in 1866, however, it was decided that the society could
not proceed under the Friendly Societies Act. The case was appealed
to the Court of Queen's 3ench, headed by the Lord Chief Justice, and
this decision was upheld, the court declaring that trade unions were
2
illegal associations.
1. Cole, G. D. H. Tne British Labour liovement, pp. 11-12
2. Slater, G : Making of Modern England, pp. 208-209
'VP'"
This decision, increasing the need of legal security for the
unions, came at a time when the employers and the public were
hoping for the suppression of the unions by law. The growing
power of the unions had led to opposition on the part of the employ-
ers, who had formed associations and had declared a number of lock-
outs. Failure to break up the unions by this method led to a hope
of legislative aid. The general public, aroused by several cases of
violence, notably the Sheffield outrages of 1366, and opposed to the
loss and inconveniences caused by strikes and lock-outs, also was
coming to favor the enactment of laws restricting or entirely suppress-
ing the unions.
A Royal Commission of Inquiry, appointed in 1867 to investigate
cases of violence in Sneffield, Manchester, and elsewhere, reported
that trade-unionism as a w^ole was not responsible for the criminal
act3 investigated. The Commission recommended that trade unions be
legalizei under certain conditions, one of the most significant in the
light of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill of 1927 being that
registration should be refused to societies whose rules authorized the
support of disputes in other trades.
A minority report filed by Frederic Harrison, Thomas Hughes, and
the Earl of Lichfield set forth the principles, frequently cited in
the debates on tne 1927 Bill, that an act committed by a workman should
not be illegal unless equally illegal if committed by any other person,
and that an act by a combination of men should not be criminal unless
criminal if committed by a single person.
I
4Harrison realized that merely legalizing the trade unions would
lay them open to the danger of legal proceedings. Accordingly he
recommended that the trade unions should be brought under the Friendly
Societies Act in order to protect their funds against misuse, but that
they should retain their incorporate status in order that lawsuits might
1
not be brought against them.
By 1869 Harrison had drafted a Bill embodying the principles of the
minority report. The Government finally agreed to a second reading of
this Bill with the understanding that the Cabinet should bring in a Bill
2
of its own the next year.
The Government Bill, as introduced by the Home Secretary in 1971,
proposed to grant the points upon wnich the leaders of the trade union
movement had insisted.
(1) No trade union was to be illegal merely because it was "in
restraint of trade."
(2) Svery union the rules of which were not in contravention of
the crininal law was to be entitled to registration.
(3) Registration should protect the union funds without interfering
with the internal organization of the union or making it liable to be
proceeded against in a court of law.
Tne ol<3 Combination Laws were repealed by the Bill, but a new penal
law against workmen was substituted which made strikes practically
impossible. Punishments were provided for threats or molestations for
the purpose of coercing employees. Picketing was expressly forbidden
1. Tebb: History of Trade Unionism, p. 271
2. " " " pp. 274-75
3. „ " p. 276
(
5in a clause prohibiting "persistently following" any person or "watch-
ing and besetting the premises" in which he was. The Act of 1359,
which had legalized peaceful persuasion to join combinations, was repealed.
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in discussing tne "Third Clause," which
contained these restrictions, say: "It seemed only too probable that the
Government measure would make it a criminal offense for two Trade Union-
ists to stand quietly in the street opposite the works of an employer
against whom they had struck, in order to communicate peacefully the fact
1
of the strike to any workman who might be ignorant of it."
The Bill of 1871 as thus drafted would legalize trade unions but
at the same time deprive them of the means of gaining their objects.
The ordinary peaceful methods employed by striking workmen were made
criminal offenses. A national Trade Unions Congress was called and
opposed the Third Section. The only concession it obtained was the
division of the Bill into two sections. The Third Section became the
Criminal Law Amendment Bill. Both Bills were passed and became law.
Several of the larger societies registered under the Act of 1871.
Dissatisfaction with the Criminal Law Amendment Act led to agitation
for its repeal, which met with no definite results until the autumn of
1874. Meanwhile many cases had been brought under this Act. Men were
imprisoned for peacefully accosting a workman in the street, for using
bad language, for inducing men not to work at a struck shop, etc. In
1871 seven women were actually imprisoned for saying "Bah" to a blackleg.
1. tfebb: Hist, of Trade Unionism, p. 2 77

In December, 1872, a sentence of a year's imprisonment was imposed
on some London gas-stokers for "conspiracy'* to molest or coerce employer
by preparing for a strike. The governing classes justified this
sentence on the ground that such a strike would be a danger to the
1
community. This is a foreshadowing of the definition of illegal
strike in Clause 1 of the 1927 Bill.
The trade unionists saw the danger in such a sentence, since it
might be applied to those striking in any trade. Agitation was begun
to remove all penal legislation concerning trade disputes.
The Liberal Government persisted in its refusal to alter the
existing laws. The Conservative Party, coming into power in 1874,
orove 3 more readily influenced by the growing political power of the
unions.
1. 7ebb: Hist, of Trade Unionism, p. 285

72. Acts of 1675-6
The Acts of 1875-6 greatly improved the position of the trade unions.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act was repealed. The Conspiracy and Pro-
tection of Property Act, which replaced it, set more reasonable and
definite limits to the extent to which the law of conspiracy might be
applied to trade disputes.
The Employers and .Torkmen Act placed the employer and employee upon
breach of engagement wa3 abolished. The means used by trade unions to
accomplisn their ends were legalized. reaceful picketing was expressly
permitted, and cases of violence and intimidation were to be dealt with
under the general criminal code. An action by a group was not to be
criminal unless equally criminal if committed by an individual.
"Collective bargaining, in short, with all its necessary accompaniments,
was, after fifty years of legislative struggle, finally recognized by
1
an equal basis as parties to a civil contract. Imprisonment for
2
the law of the land."
1. •itebb: Hist, of Trade Unionism, p. 291
• N '» N p. 291
>
8B. Growth of political power
1. Representation in parliament
The enactment of so much industrial legislation showed the trade
unionists the desirability of representation in the House of Commons.
Gladstone's refusal in 18 72 to consider changing the trade union laws
had resulted in a general agitation, and in the election of 1874 thirteen
trade union members were candidates. Two of these men were elected,
without opposition by the Liberal Party, The Labour Representation
League, first forerunner of the present Labor Party, had fostered their
cand idatures
•
It the Trade Union Congress of 1374 it was announced that several
societies, among them miners and ironworkers, had appropriated money to
support trade union men as candidates for r'arliament. This seems to be
the beginning of political funds collected by trade unions.
From 1874 until the establishment of the Labor Party there was in
every Parliament a group of members elected from the working class with the
support of the Liberals and acting as a part of the Liberal Party in
Parliament. An organization known as the Independent Labour Party,
formed in 1893, was without success in supporting candidates for Parliament,
The modern Labor Party, which had its beginning in the Labor Representa-
tion Committee formed in 1900, also met with but slight success at first.
The Labor Representation Committee was made up of an alliance of the trade
unions, the co-operative societies, and the Socialist societies, with the
exception of the Social Democratic Federation. After a slow beginning.
t
9by 1902 the Labor Representation Committee succeeded in practically
doubling the number of adhering trade unions and trade councils and the
1 j total membership. The Miners* Federation in 1902 voted a levy of a
penny a month to create a Parliamentary Fund. Between 1902 and 1906
three out of six of the labor Representation Committee candidates were
successful in contesting bye-elections.
One of the greatest incentives to the growth of the labor Repre-
1
sentation Committee had been the Taff Yale Decision of 1901. The
subsequent general election in 1906 showed the effect of the decision
on the political activities of the Labor movement. Twenty-nine of
the fifty independent Labor candidates in this election were successful.
They formed a separate party in the aouse of Commons. The Labor
Representation Committee changed its name to "Labor Party."
In 1909 the iliners' Federation went over to the Labor Party, taking
eleven of tneir fourteen parliamentary members from the Liberal benches
to tne support of the new party, and thus ending the Liberal-Labor
group which had existed since 1874.
Tne Osborne Judgment, preventing the trade unions from applying
their funds to political purposes, together with the opposition of the
Liberal leaders, served cniefly to stimulate the growth of the new party
among tne trade unions.
'j| Tne following table gives a summary of the progress of the Labor
2
Party in parliamentary representation and in political strength.
1. See p. if
2. Labour Year Book 1925, p. l c 9
(*
General
Election
Seats
Contest ed
Members
Returned
Labor
Vote
1900 15
1906 50
1910 (Jan.) 78
1910 (Dec.) 56
1918 361
192£ 414
1923 427
19 24 514
2
29
40
42
57
142
191
151
62,698
323,195
505,690
370,802
2,244,945
4,236,733
4,348,379
5,487,620
(
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The period of most rapid growth began in 1918, reaching its
climax in the Labor Government of 19£4.
Conditions during and immediately after the war made possible
a Labor government. The Labor Party in Parliament nad officially
adopted socialism as an aim. Tne Defense of the Realm Acts passed
during the war nad put industries, transportation, etc., under govern-
ment control. England had been practically socialized, and a great
saving had resulted. Labor policies had been tried out with beneficial
results.
Tne unemployment, with its consequent misery, which followed
government "decontrol" after the war was another reason for the growth
of the Labor Party. Demobilization, discharge of government employees,
and difficulties in readjusting industry to peace-time conditions made
the problem of unemployment acute. The Labor Party made the relief of
unemployment one of the outstanding features of its platform.
In 1918 the first general election held in eight years was a decided
victory for Premier Llo;.-^ George's Coalition government, which won 478
seats. The Labor Party, although it made a considerable gain and was
the largest opposition group, was obliged to share the position of
official Opposition witn tne Asquith Liberals.
3y 1922, however, the Coalition broke up, as the Conservatives
favored a return to normal party government. The election of that year
resulted in 336 seats for the Conservative Party, 110 for the Liberals
(divided between adherents of Asquith and of Lloyd George), and 144 for
<
*
12
Labor. This election gave the Labor Party its first experience as
official Opposition. Ramsay MacDonald was chosen as party leader.
Then Premier Baldwin called a general election in 1923 on the
question of imperial preference, the results were:
Conservative 259
Liberal 150
Labor 192
The Conservatives found it impossible to form a government, and
the Labor Party took office in February 1924, with Ramsay LlacDonald
as Premier.
The Labor Government remained in office nine months. Lacking
a majority, its power was decidedly limited. It did, however, show
considerable competence in office. tfnowden's budget was the greatest
achievement. The foreign policy, under Ramsay MacDonald's administra-
tion, was good. The problem of unemployment, however, remained unsolved.
The experience in office gave good political training and made the
Labor Party a better Opposition.
The election of November, 1924, resulted in 150 seats for the Labor
Party, 440 for the Conservatives, and 30 for the Liberals. The Labor
Party had definitely replaced the Liberals in prominence.
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2. Relation of trade-unionism to Labor Party
The trade unions played an important part in the growth of the Labor
Party. The Labor Party had its origin in an alliance of trade unions
and the Socialist societies. The Tebbs give the Socialist members the
credit for cent ribut ins the necessary zeal and political talent, while
1
the trade unions have brought in a more extensive membersnip.
The following figures indicate the oreponderance of the trade union
2
membership:
LA OUR rARTY MESSRS HIP
Trade Unions Socialist, etc. Societies Total
Eo. Mem'ship So. Mem*ship
1900-1 41 353,070 3 22,861 375,931
1905-6 158 904,496 2 16,784 921,280
1910 151 1,394,402 2 31,377 1,430,539
1915 111 2,053,735 2 32,838 2,093,365
1921 116 3,973,558 5 36,803 4,010,361
The new Labor Party constitution of 1918 first opened the member-
ship to individuals who were not members of the affiliated societies.
In 1922 the total Labor representation in Parliament was 142.
The following fisrores show which organizations were responsible for the
3
candidatures of these Members:
1. Tebb: History of Trade Unionism, p. 688
2. Labour and Capital in Pari., p. 31
3. m n p. 32
(f f
(
I
14
Members returned under auspices of
:
Trade Unions 84
Divisional Labour Parties 20
The Independent Labour Party 32
Other Socialist Societies 2
The Co-operative Party 4
142
Of the 142 Labour Members, seventy-eight were full-time trade union
officials. Only thirteen were manual workers.
The majority of the Labor Members of to-day are drawn from the ranks
of trade union officials.
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C. Financial security
1. Taff Vale decision
The development of the Labor Party was in part due to the
obstacles placed in the way of trade-unionism by the Taff Vale
decision and the Osborne judgment. These two checks showed the
trade-unionists the need of acquiring political power in order to
protect their interests by securing favorable legislation.
The Taff Vale decision of 1901 followed a period of several
years marked by a reaction on the nart of the public against the
neculiar status understood to be c anceded to the trade unions by the
Acts of 1371-76. Since 1876 trade unions had been free from legal
proceedings against their corporate funds. In 1891 a Royal
Commission on Labor had recommended that the unions be made legal
corporations, able to sue and liable to Qe sued at law.
In 1900 a strike by the employees of the Taff vale Railway
Company in South Vales was marked by some unlawful acts. Tne
General Manager of tne company sued tne Amalgamated Society of
Railway Servants ratner than the individual workmen responsible for
the unlawful acts. The union claimed that it could not be sued
as it was not a corporate body. The case was carried to the highest
court, where it was decided that a union, while not a corporation,
could be sued in its corporate capacity for damages caused by actions

16
of its officers, and that injunctions could be issued against it.
The trade unions thus were given the liabilities of corporate
bodies without having the advantages of corporations.
This decision halted the activities of trade unions to a great
extent, as many acts mignt be construed as wrongful and the unions
sued. since it nad been decided that injunctions could be issued
restraining a union from "unlawfully, though without criminality, caus-
1
ing loss to other persons," it became futile to engage in strikes,
since all strikes involve financial loss to the employers.
Many actions were brought against trade unions, and the union
funds were held liable in a number of cases.
1. Webb: History of Trade Unionism, p. 600
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2. The Trade Disputes Act (1906)
The rapid growth of the Labor Party both in membership and in
political force was one of tne man ifestati on s of the feeling aroused
by the Taff Vale case. Tne cnief aim of %'ns party was tne passage
of legislation reversing the Taff Vale judgment. Rejecting the
Government 3ill, it secured tne passage of the Trade Disputes Act of
1906, granting the unions great immunity. This Act has been called
1
the main charter of trade unionism.
The clause upon which the trade unionists placed the greatest
emphasis was the fourth section, which provided that no action should
be brought against any trade union, whether of employers or workmen,
or any union members, for the recovery of damages as the result of any
2
tortious act committed by or on behalf of the trade union.
The Act also provided that, when committed in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute, no act committed in concert should be
actionable unless actionable if committed by an individual; that
peaceful picketing should be lawful; and that no act should be action-
able merely because it induced a person to break a contract or inter-
fered with another's business or nis right to dispose of nis capital
3
or his labor as he wisned.
Tne Trade Disputes Act, granting tne trade unions such unusual
immunity, called forth mucn hostile criticism, especially from employer
of labor.
1. Webb: Hist, of Trade Unionism, p. 606
2. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, sec. 4, sub-sec. 1. Cited by Pipkin;
The Idea of Social Justice, p. 319
3. Tebb: Hist, of Trade Unionism, p. 606
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3. The Osborne Judgment (1908)
The first important case concerning a political levy was brought
in 1908, when a man named Osborne, a member of the Amalgamated Society
of Railway Servants, sought to restrain the society by law from spend-
ing any of its funds for political purposes. The case was carried,
to the highest court, where it was decided that a levy far political
purposes could not lawfully be made.
Tne argument was that a trade union, being regarded as a corporate
body, could do nothing wnicn was not authorized by the statute in-
corporating it. The definition enacted in the Trade Union Act of 1871
was to be regarded as enumerating the purposes which a trade union
could lawfully pursue. Since the use of funds far political purposes
was not mentioned as one of those purposes, it could not lawfully be
1
done •
Some of the money from the trade union funds had been used for the
payment of members of Parliament. It is interesting to note that in
1911, while still refusing to reverse the Osborne decision by statute,
Parliament voted that all members should receive a salary of L400 a
year
.
1. Tebb: Hist, of Trade Unionism, p. 609

4. The Trade Unions Act (1913)
In 1913 an Act was oassed providing that a trade union should
have power to include any lawful purposes in its constitution and
to apply its funds to any of these objects. Before undertaking
the financing of certain political purposes, however, there should
be a ballot and the purpose should be approved by the majority of
votes. The money should be taken from a special political fund.
Any member might claim exemption from contributing to this political
fund.
This method of political levy, commonly known as "contracting
out," remained in force until the passage of the Trade Disputes and
Trade Unions Bill of 1927.
c(
20
i
II precipitating causes of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions
Bill
A Coal Strike
1. Condition of mining industry previous to granting of
subsidy.
The precipitating cause of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions
Bill was the general strike of 1926, which in turn resulted from the
coal disputes begun in preceding years, iiati onalizati on of the coal
mining industry, wages, and working hours were among the points at
issue.
Before the war the miners' wages had been determined by a rather
complex method. Each coal-field had a "standard" or basis rate of
wages representing tne sctual level in tnat coal-field for some
particular year in the p^ist. Tne years 1877, 1379, and 1888 were
used in various areas. Tne actual rates were determined on
percentage advances on the standard rate.
Tne Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act of 1912, which applied only
to underground workers, had provided for the fixing of a legal minimum
wage rate in each district of the Federation by a Joint District Board
with an impartial chairman.
During the period of Government control, from 1917 to 1921, all
increases were made on a national basis. Wage increases on a flat-
rate basis had been granted on several occasions.

El
A strike in 1920, settled October 28, resulted in a temporary
scneme to vary wages according to the total output of the mines
and the value of the output. Owners and miners were to meet and
work out a permanent scheme, to be submitted to the Government by
March 31, 1921. The owners, however, believed decontrol must be
accompanied by wage reductions in many districts, and refused to put
wage regulation upon a national basis. In March the owners pub-
lished district schedules of wage rates which would prevail after April
1. Tne result was a three-month cessation of work in the mines.
The terms of settlement (national 7/ages Agreement) reacned on
July 1 provided f or a distribution of the proceeds of the industry
in agreed proportions between wages and profits. The scheme was as
follows
:
"1. In each district forming a unit for the ascertainment of wages,
the collieries make returns of their working- results over a given
period, and tne returns of the collieries in the district are aggregated.
"2. From tne aggregate wages oill is deducted tne amount of
'standard wages, ' i. e., tne existing basis rates plus the percentages
whicn were payable on basis rates in July 1914.
"3. Seventeen per cent, of the amount of standard wages con-
stitutes the standard profits of the owners.
"4. After deducting from the gross proceeds the standard wages,
the standard profits, and the costs of production other than wages,
the surplus is divisible in the proportion of 83 per cent, to wages
and 17 per cent, to profits.
n5. The standard wages and the share of the surplus apportioned
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to wages are added together. The sum thus obtained is expressed
as a percentage on basis rates, and this percentage constitutes tne
rate of wages during the next period,
"6. In no case can wages fall below a point 20 per cent, above
the standard wages.
"7. If the rate of wages does not provide a subsistence wage to
low-paid daily wagement, the scheme provides for the making of such
allowances per shift worked to the daily wages of these workers as
may be necessary for this purpose.
"8. If in any period the proceeds, after deduction of costs
other than wages and the cost of the standard wages, prove to have
been insufficient to meet the standard profits, the deficiency is
carried forward as a first charge to be met out of any surplus in
1
subsequent periods."
The trouble in 1925 arose from an attempt on the part of the
owners in the Mining Association to reduce wages. The National Wages
Agreement had failed to satisfy the miners in that it provided that
wages should be fixed by district boards, instead of being upon a
national basis. Consequently the Miners' federation on Jan. 17,
1924 gave a three month notice of their intention to withdraw from
the agreement. The British coal exports to Germany, as a result of
the French occupation of the Ruhr, had risen from 8,345,606 tons in
1922 to 14,806,232 tons in 1923. The miners, therefore, felt justi-
fied in seeking an increased minimum wage, although they were warned
1. R
.
A. S. Redmayne : Tne Britisn Coal-Mining Industry During the War,

that such unusual conditions in the industry would probably not be
permanent
•
Tne Labor Government, then coming into power, establisned a
Court of Inquiry to investigate toe points at issue* Tne Court re-
commended that the owners and miners should come to a new agreement.
The terms finally agreed upon increased the minimum wages. This
agreement was to remain in force from May 1, 19E4 to Hay 1, 1925,
after which date it might be terminated by either side upon a month's
notice
.
The freeing of the Ruhr district caused an immense decrease in
the total British coal exports, which fell from 46,931,482 tons in
1923 to 27,432,703 tons in 1924. At the same time the cost of
production was increased, as a result of the new wage scales. Con-
sequently, the Mining Association, in the summer of 1925, announced
that a lower rate of wages would go into effect and that only the men
accepting the new rates would be permitted to continue work.
Tie miners naturally opposed the reduction. A new Court of
Inquiry, appointed to investigate this dispute, presented on July
28 a Report stating that minimum wages should be guaranteed before
profits were taken. This Report, however, failed to relieve the
tense feeling that existed between the parties to the dispute.
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2. Subsidy
a. Why granted
Q j Other organized industries, particularly the railwaymen and the
engineers, felt tnat the miners should be supported, lest their defeat
might mean a widespread reduction of wages and increase in hours. The
Trade Unions Congress was place i in charge of allying tne unions and
of calling strikes if necessary • The railwaymen and transport
workers pledged themselves not to move any coal in the event of a
lock- cut
•
The Government, deciding that a general strike must be averted
at any cost, promised a subsidy to extend from August 1, 1925 to May
1, 1926, in order to maintain wages on the basis of the 1924 agreement
•
A Government Commission in the meantime was to conduct an inquiry with
the aim of placing the industry in a better economic condition. Sir
Herbert Samuel was appointed chairman of tnis commission.
The granting of the subsidy has been widely criticized on the
grounds tnat it was economically unjustifiable and tnat, having been
granted unconditionally, it served only to increase a desire for state
help and to deaden the tendency of the industry to be self-supporting.
Others base their criticism on the theory that the granting of the
subsidy was a blow to democracy, since it represented the yielding
of a democratically elected Parliament to a threat of force by the
Trade Unions Congress. This same line of reasoning was followed by
those who in 1926 characterized the general strike as a threat to
democratic government.
«
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Premier Baldwin, however, found himself in a difficult position
when the Trade Unions Congress, representing over 4,000,000 members,
was placed in charge of the miners' side of the dispute. There
was a general feeling of unrest in the industrial world at that time.
The Prime Minister may have believed tnat tne Government was not then
in a position to face the threatened general strike, and may have
considered the subsidy strategically justifiable in that it gave more
time to meet the emergency,
b. Effects of subsidy
The effects of the subsidy were not entirely satisfactory, although
the main aim, that of gaining time, was accomplished. The Government
was criticized for not making the restoration of the eight-hour day a
1
condition of the grant* The eignt-hour day for under-ground
workers established by the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1908, had in
1919 been reduced to a seven-hour day upon the recommendation of a Coal
Commission headed by Justice Sankey, following a demand by the miners
for a six-hour day. Many of the operators claimed the shortened
hours were one cause of the lack of prosperity in the mining industry,
and
,
favoring the restoration of the eight-hour day, believed the change
should have been made at that time.
The subsidy, moreover, artificially boosted the wages of the miners
and, according to the Report of the Commission, gave the owners higher
2
profits, in some districts, than those that were common before the war.
1. Samuel Ueil: Peace Prospects in the Coal Industry. Sng. Review Mar*
1926
2. Coal Report. Times Teekly Edition, Mar. 18, 1926.
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3. Report of the Coil Commission
a. Hain features
The Coal Commission, under Sir Herbert Samuel, received such
definitely conflicting suggestions from owners and miners, that it
was impossible for the P.eport to be satisfactory to both sides.
Tne Report, published about the middle of March 1926, rejected
the proposal of the Miners' federation for nationalization of the
industry, suggesting instead State ownership of coal. The Commission
proposed that the subsidy should not be extended beyond April 30, the
date on wnich it was due to expire. A revision of the wage scale
provided by the 1924 agreement was recommended as preferable to
lengthening the working day. The opinion was given that "revision
of the minimum percentage should depend upon acceptance by all parties
of sucn measures of reorganization as will secure to the industry
1
a new lease of prosperity leading to higher wages." Moreover,
before those engaged in the industry were asked to make any sacrifices,
"it shall be definitely agreed between them that all practicable means
for improving its organization and increasing its efficiency should be
1
adonted as speedily as the cir cunstances allow."
b. Effect of the Report
The Government, although not entirely satisfied witn all parts of
the Report, announced on March 24 that it would accept it and give it
legislative effect provided tnat tne owners and miners would abide by
1. Coal Report, Times Weekly Edition, Mar. 18, 1926

27
its provisions. The owners, likewise with some reluctance, agreed
1
to accept the Report*
) The miners would not accept the Report without reservations,
as tney were still opposed to any wage reductions.
The shortness of the period before the expiration of the subsidy
placed all parties involved in the negotiations under a great nervous
tension. On several occasions a complete break between the opera-
tors and miners was threatened. The owners yielded in the first
serious difference, which arose over the Question of national or
district wage scales.
On April 15, however, the owners gave notice that the existing
ware agreement would be terminated on April 30. The miners declared
this action was a threat of lock-out, and broke off negotiations.
On April 27 Baldwin brought the miners and ovai ers togetner in another
conference, which ended tnree days later wnen the miners refused
the terms offered by the operators, involving longer hours and a
reduction of the minimum wage.
1. P.alston Hay den: Great Britain's Labor Strife^ Current History,
June 1926
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B General Strike
1 Cause
On May 1 Premier Baldwin was notified that the conduct of the
dispute for the miners 1 side nad been turned over to the General
Council of the Trade Unions Congress. The General Council,
employing the tactics that had been successful in 1925, issued a
memorandum calling a general strike of all transport workers in
case no settlement was reacned by midnight on May 3. A proclama-
tion was then issued by the king, acting under the Emergency Powers
Act of 1920, declaring a state of emergency. These acts made the
struggle more dangerous, for the owners and the Government now had
to deal with the Trade Unions Congress, representing the organized
force of labor in Great Britain. The general strike was definitely
threatened
•
Premier Baldwin, however, continued his efforts toward a
settlement until Sunday night. May 2. He then heard that the
union printers on the Daily Mail had refused to print an article
called "For King and Country," which declared tnat no civilized
government would permit a general strike. Negotiations were
terminated that evening, possibly as a result of the action of
the printers, which may have been interpreted as an overt act on the
part of the trade unions.
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2. Aim
A manifesto issued by the General Council of the T. U. C.
on Sunday evening, May 2, declared that the general strike was called
purely as a means for settling a trade dispute, and not as an attempt
to coerce the public. In the words of this statement: "A situation
of the utmost gravity has been produced by the action of the mine-
owners in locking out more than a million mine-workers, and by the
failure of the Government to make any acceptable proposals to enable
the industry to continue without any further degradation of the
standards of life and labour in the coal-fields pending reorganization
The General Council, accordingly, stated that it had been compelled
"to organise united resistance to tne attempt to enforce a settlement
1
of the mining problem at the expense of the mine-workers' wages."
Many who were not trade unionists imputed less noble aims to tne
General Council. Some regarded the strike as an attempt to wring
from the Government an extension of the subsidy. Premier Baldwin
2
called tne strike an attack upon constitutional government.
An editorial writer in the Outlook (London) characterized the
general strike as an act of reprisal against the nation, entered
upon as a result of the failure of the trade union leaders to receive
3
what they desired from the Government.
1. Manifesto of Gen. Council of T. U. C. - Appendix I, pp. 61-62,
Three Speeches on the General strike, Sir John iiraon
2. Message from the Prime Minister, Sat. Rev., May 8, 1926
3. Men and Matters, Outlook (Lond.) May 8, 1926
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3. Extent
Possibly 2,000,000 men participated in the ensuing general
1
strike. The trades and industries called on by the I. U. C.
General Council to cease work included transport, printing, iron
and steel, metal and neavy chemicals, building, and electricity
2
and gas production.
The unwise suppression of the newspapers left the Government
broadcasting practically the only means of publicity. A great
force of volunteers assisted in the necessary industries, running
motor buses and electric trains, etc. There was no serious dis-
order, in spite of the presence on the streets of many striking
workmen
•
4. Duration
The general strike lasted from midnight on Kay 3 to May 12, when
a conference of the General Council of the T. U. C. with Premier
Baldwin was followed by the announcement of the termination of the
strike in order that negotiations might be resumed.
5. Result
8
The results of the general strike are interesting when considered
in connection witn tne question of the necessity of a bill for
preventing similar strikes in the future.
1. C. F. G. Llasterman: The Trades-Union War In £ngland. Atlantic
Monthly, Oct. 1927, p. 534
2. Appendix I, pp. 57-58, Three Speeches on the Gen. Strike, by sir
John Simon*
t
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Masterman states that three significant results emerged.
The first was that the cessation of railway communication was shown
to he "a useless method of lightning strike, " since "every road has
become a railway." The second was that the "bourgeoisie M were
able to fight the laborer and defeat him at his own game because of
superior resourcefulness, intelligence, and courage. The third
result was that unskilled labor showed itself able to take over with
very little training work that had been believed too difficult for
1
any except skilled laborers.
These results would seem to indicate that tne general strike
was an experiment not 7>ortn repeating.
6. Question of legality
a. The opinion of Sir Jonn Simon
Tne question of the legality of the general strike, which was
to be so thoroughly argued in the debate on the 1927 Bill, was
considered even before the termination of the strike.
Sir John Simon, former Attorney-General, in a speech in the
House of Commons on Llay 6, 1926, declared the general strike illegal
as it involved breach of contract. He stated that the right to
strike was perfectly lawful, but that H it will be very necessary to
appreciate that tnis so-called general strike is not a strike at all.
2
It is something very different." He further declared taat the
1. C. F. G. masterman: The Trades-Union War in England. Atlantic
Monthly, Oct. 1927, p. 534
2. Simon: Three Speeches on the Gen. Strike, p. 2
c<
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decision "to call out everybody, regardless of the contracts which
those workmen had made, was not a lawful act at all. avery work-
man who was bound by a contract to give notice before he left work,
and who, in view of that decision, has either cnosen of nis free will
or nas felt compelled to come out by leaving his employment without
1
giving proper notice, has broken the law.
In his speech in the House of Commons on May 11 sir John Simon
developed the proposition that the general strike "is not, properly
understood, a trade dispute at all," but is "a movement of a perfectly
c
different and of a wholly unconstitutional and unlawful character."
He continued, with some inconsistency in his choice of words, to say
that the general strike "is not, properly understood, a strike at all
because a strike is a strike against employers to compel employers
to do something, but a General Strike is a strike against the general
public to make the public, Parliament and tne Government do something.'
b. The Astbury Judgment
In support of his views Simon quoted from a decision handed down
on I.'ay 11 by Justice Astbury. The national Sailors' and Firemen's
Union had applied for an injunction to restrain officials of the Tower
Hill Branch of the union from calling union members out on strike in
response to the instructions of tae General Council of tne T. U. C.
In giving his decision Astbury said: "The so-called general strike
called by the Trades Unions Congress is illegal and contrary to law,
and those persons inciting or taking part in it are not protected by
1. Ibid. pp. 3-4
2. Simon: Tnree Speeches on the Gen. St., p. 15
cz
r «
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the Trade Disputes Act of 1906. Uo trade dispute has been alleged
or shown to exist in any of the Unions affected, except in the
miners* case, and no trade dispute does or can exist between the
Trades Union Congress on the one hand and the Government and the
1
nation on the other."
c. Opinion of Sir Henry Slesser
Sir Henry Slesser, who was Solicitor-General in the Labor
Cabinet of 1924, took the opposite view on the question of the
legality of the general strike. He cited the case of The Queen
v. Cooper (reported in Four State Trials
, p. 1250) as against Sir
John Simon's claim of constitutional illegality. The Astbury
decision, he claimed, was given in a case not argued for the
defendant by counsel and in which no objection was taken that the
legality of the strike was irrelevant to tne issue. There was
no basis, according to Sir Henry Slesser, for the theory that the
mere generality of the cessation of labor introduces an illegal
2
element •
It Simon: Three Speeches on the Gen. St. Appendix II, Mr. Justice
Astbury 1 s Judgment, p. 68
2. Slesser: The legality of General Strikes. Hew Statesman,
July 17, 1926.
t
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C. Condition of Capital and Labor at the commencement of the
Parliamentary session of 1927 .
1. Failure of miners 1 strike
The general strike nad distracted public interest from an
impersonal consideration of the merits of the miners' case and
probably had alienated public sympathy to some extent. The
miners, however, continued their resistance until December, 1926,
when lack of the necessary funds to continue the strike forced
them to submit and to return to work with reduced wages^
2, Condition of trade unions.
Opinions differ as to the effect of the general strike on the
trade unions. An editorial writer in the iflew Statesman declared
that the strike taught two lessons. The first was that the "human
strength" of trade unionism proved to be a surprise. Trade union-
ise redeemed its error of the "Black Friday" of 1921 and by its good
showing brought about an increase in membership both of the trade
unions and of the Labor Party. The workers enjoyed a new feeling
of community as a result of their joint action. Tne second lesson
of the strike was that a general strike can never be a "direct success5 "
because of the superior power of tne modern state. aucii strikes,
however, used for short periods, will prove useful in showing working-
class opinion, especially when public opinion coincides. The general
strike may be regarded as "one of the ultimate safeguards of democracy
1
and even of the Constitution."
1. Some Lessons of the Late General strike New Statesman, June 19, 1926
CI
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Masterman believes the results of the strike are not so
favorable to trade unionism. He says tnat "the trade-unions who
participated in it had cut their own throats by the general strike.
Some, like the railway men, had lost more than a million pounds
of their reserve capital. Others, like the miners, were in an
actual state of fissure, with rival unions against rival unions,
just as national fissure occurred in Germany after it nad been
1
destroyed by the Versailles Treaty."
3. Attitude of the mine owners.
The mine owners, according to Masterman, were in no better
situation. The increase of coal raised after the restoration of
the eight-hour day proved a grlut on the market. The owners were
forced to sell at a loss, and in many cases were obliged to close
the nits. These misfortunes, blamed upon the strikers, aroused a
]
desire for vindictive measures.
1. Masterman: Tee Trades-Union War in England. Atl . Monthly, Oct.
1927, p. 536
cz
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III Parliamentary history of Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill
A. Origin
1. Scarborough Conference
The Conference of the Conservative Party opened at Scarborough
on October 7. Resolutions were passed wnich strongly favored
trade union legislation. Premier Baldwin's speech indicated that
he, while favoring such a bill, wished more investigation before de-
termining upon the exact terms. He said in part: "We are fully
alive to the importance of the question. As soon as we nave completed
our examination of the subject, we shall prepare a bill and proceed
with it in Parliament. When we are in a position to present that
Bill we shall rely with confidence on you for the loyal support which
1
you nave fully given us in the past."
2. Changed attitude of Baldwin
Two years before, when the Lacquisten Political Levy Bill had been
introduced, Premier Baldwin had asked the Conservatives not to support
it, as he was opposed to the Government's taking the first step in any-
thing resembline- an industrial war. The Prime Minister stated that
the general strike was the cause of his chansre of attitude. Master-
man, however, explains the Prime Minister's support of the Bill thus:
"But the great trusts and combines, tne eisployer class, and all who
had been induced by fear to hate the working people, including the
1. Hews of tne TCeek, Spectator, Oct. 16, 1926
!
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Conservative official organizations, brought pressure on Mr. Baldwin,
for once supported by the quaint adventurers in his Cabinet. He
gave way, and signed the document which meant a declaration of war.
Mr. Baldwin is a kindly man; he is a well-meaning man; but he is
1
a weak man.
"
3. Failure to consult Labor leaders.
The commission chosen to investigate the situation was made up
entirely of members of the Conservative Party. No non-party conference
was called, although some of the Labor leaders, dissatisfied with the
existing trade union methods in regard to balloting, intimidation, tae
political levy, etc., might nave contributed suggestions of some value.
A bill worked out by such a conference might nave escaped becoming a
party issue. If the Labor leaders had been invited and nad refused
to participate in a conference they would have weakened their powers
of resistance to the Government Bill.
4. The Zing's Speech
Premier Baldwin failed to see the need of propaganda for the Bill,
and did little to prepare tne country for a favorable reception of it
before the opening of Parliament. Even in the King's Speech he had
nothing definitely fostering the Bill* The most direct reference to
it was extremely vague; "Recent events have made evident the importance
of defining and amending the law with reference to industrial disputes.
1. Masterman: The Trades-Union War in England. Atlantic Monthly,
Oct. 1927, p. 536
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1
Proposals for this purpose will be laid before you."
B. Brief summary of history of Bill in the House of Commons
1. Publication of text of Bill
The publication of the text of the Bill on April 4 caused so
much political excitement that a bitter dispute was anticipated.
Although the need for some revision of trade union regulations,
especially in regard to intimidation, was widely conceded, many
doubted the wisdom of introducing such a Bill at a time when the
need of industrial peace seemed imperative.
The Bill was immediately criticized for the vagueness of the
terms used in connection with illegal strikes and intimidation, as
well as for the failure to make lock-outs illegal on the same
conditions as strikes.
The Labor Party members feared the change in the method of
political levy would greatly decrease the political funds of the
trade unions and correspondingly limit their opportunities of
parliamentary representation.
W. A. Appleton, Secretary of the General Federation of Trade
2
Unions, said, in the Morning Post of April 6: "The Bill represents
an unwise ambition to pass legislation which can never be effective.
It will involve trade unions in endless litigation. It will invite
them to cease to function as trade unions, and to become more or less
1. King's Speech, cited in Official Report, Pari. Debates in H. G.
Vol. 205, Col. 1798
2. Cited in lews of the ,Veek, Spectator, Apr. 9, 1927
<
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secret political societies."
Tne Labor Party announced its intention of fighting the Bill
and of repealing it in the event of another Labor Government. The
General Council of the T. U. C. formed a body called the Trade
Union Defence Committee to oppose the Bill.
2. Second reading.
a. Speech of the Attorney-General
When the House of Commons reassembled on April 26, interest
was centered in the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill, the only
issue which was expected to arouse determined opposition. The
Labor Party was handicapped by the absence of Ramsay MacDonald,
whose place was not adeauately filled by J. i\. Clynes, the
temporary party leader, or by Philip Snowden, J. H. Tnomas, or other
prominent Labor Members*
On ilay 2 trie Bill was introduced for its second reading in a tw©
hour speech by the Attorney-General, Sir Douglas Hogg, wno was
frequently interrupted by remarks and oat-calls from the Labor
benches. Many of the members of the Labor Party walked out, one
of them, Mr. Jack Jones, leaving at the invitation of the Speaker
after calling the Attorney-General "a liar from the top of his head.
1
to the sole of his foot."
While it t&s evident that Sir Douglas Hogg failed to hold the
interest of the members of the opposition, such tactics on the part
of the Labor members did little to aid their fight against the Bill.
1. Official Report of Pari. Debates in H. C, Vol. 205, Col. 1327
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The Attorney-General stated that the Bill supported four
principles. "The first main proposition is this, that a general
strike is illegal and no man shall he penalized for refusing to
take part in it. The second proposition is this, that intimidation
is illegal, and no man shall be compelled by threats to abstain
from work against his will. i'ne tnird proposition is this, that
no man snail be compelled to subscribe to the funds of any political
party unless he so desires. The fourth and last proposition is
this, that any person entering the established Civil Service must
1
give his undivided allegiance to the State."
Sir Douglas Hogg then proceeded to discuss the clauses of the
Bill. Clause 1, making the general strike illegal, he said was
merely declaratory of the law, as it followed the Astbury Judgment
given at the time of the strike. Sir Henry Slesser rose to dispute
the point, but was not recognized by the Speaker. The definition
of a strike Sir Douglas Hogg gave as the concerted action of a number
2
of persons employed acting in concert to refuse work." For a
definition of a general strike he drew upon the words of Lord Oxford:
"What distinguishes a general strike from others is this, that it is
a blow, not struck by one combatant at the other, but directed,
whether in intention or not, in effect by its inevitable results at
2|^ the very vitals of tne community."
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1306
2. " mm 205t » -^qq
1
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The Attorney-General then discussed the question of whether
the probability of the recurrence of the general strike was
great enough to necessitate a bill guarding against it. He first
quoted several members to indicate tnat many of tne Labor leaders
were convinced of the folly aid wickedness of the general strike."
Samsay MacDonald had said that "the General Strike is a weapon which
cannot be wielded for industrial purposes. If fought to a finish
1
as a strike, it would ruin trade-unionism." After the strike,
in Hay 1926, LIr. LiacDonald aad said: "We are not likely to hear much
more of a general strike as an effective industrial weapon. Its
blow is not against tne employers, but against ordinary folk in the
1
mass." J. R. Clynes, in Hay, had written: "I have never believed
in the policy of a General Strike. It would be unwise ever to
repeat what has been done The whole idea of trying to settle
1
anything by such a method was a delusion."
Thomas and Snowden were referred, to as sharing this viewpoint.
To indicate, however, tnat this opinion was not shared by the
entire Labor Party, the Attorney -General quoted from Hicks, the
Cnairman of the Executive Council of the Trade Unions Congress, who
said : "It would appear tnat general strikes of a more intense and
formidable character than the one recently experienced, are inevitable.
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1312
2. " " " 205, " 1313
C IT
\
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Purcell, Member of Parliament for the Forest of Dean, said:
"The class struggle itself, the inexorable urge of economic forces,
is going to create tne conditions for other and more formidable
general strikes. Uext time, however, the procedure will be different^
1
the conduct of the strike will be improved upon."
The fact that such views were still held was considered by the
Attorney-General a justification for the introduction of Clause 1 of
the Bill.
In order that such a strike should be illegal under the Bill,
it must be a strike not purely industrial, and must be "intended or
calculated to coerce the Government or to intimidate the community or
a substantial part thereof instead of being directed against the
2
individual employer."
The omission of any mention of lock-outs Sir Douglas Hogg justified
on the grounds that tnere never had been a general lock-out, and that
in case of the occurrence of such a lock-out in the future the Govern-
ment already had power, under the Emergency Powers Act of 1920, to take
over the works from the employers and run them.
The question might arise of how a workman could know, when asked
to join a strike, whether that strike was legal or illegal. This
difficulty^iir Douglas Hogg said, was obviated by Clause 7, which
empowered the Attorney-General to take a threatened general strike to
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1313
2- 9m 205, Col. 1215
c
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the courts. The Court, if it decided that such a general strike was
threatened, oould prevent the use of trade union funds to support it.
The court decision, following the action of the Attorney -General , would
1
determine the legality of the strike.
Clause 2, referred to by the opposition as the clause that would
legalize "blacklegs," provided that no one should be penalized by nis
trade union for refusing to participate in an illegal strike. A.
sub-section provided that any person so penalized might apply to the
courts for reinstatement and compensation. This clause was made
2
retroactive to apply to the general strike of 1926»
The third clause dealt with intimidation. Sub-section (1) was
intended to be merely declaratory of the existing law, permitting
peaceful persuasion and peaceful communication of information.
Su'c-sections (2) and (3) were intended to alter the existing
law by enlarging the definition of intimidation to include more than
merely threats of personal violence. Threats of other kinds should
also be considered forms of intimidation, such as warning a workman
"that if ne dares to continue work his family, his wife, will be
ostracized, his children's lives will be made intolerable for them,
and he himself will be driven out of work and hounded out of the
3
street or into the workhouse.'
Sub-section (4) prohibited watching and besetting a workman's house.
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1318
2. " " " 205, Col. 1320
3. " " " 205, Col. 1323
r
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The explanation of Clause 4, dealing with the political levy,
was given with some difficulty due to incessant interruptions from
the Labor benches.
The existing law, that of 1913, permitted trade unions to main-
tain political funds provided tnat a favorable majority vote was
obtained in a secret ballot of the union members. Any member who
was unwilling to contribute to the political levy might be exempt by
giving notice that he did not desire to subscribe.
It had been alleged that under that system union members found
1
themselves "practically compelled to subscribe" to the political fund.
The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill aimed to correct that
fault by substituting a method by which only those should subscribe
who definitely agreed to do so and filled out in writing a required
form. Clause 4 also provided that tne political fund should be
collected as a separate levy. Unregistered trade unions would be
required to make the same returns as the registered unions.
The substance of Clause 5 was stated as follows: "In the case of
the established Civil Service any trade union, by wnich I mean for the
moment an organization whose primary object is to influence or
affect the renumeration and conditions of employment of its members,
must be confined to members of the Civil Service, and must not be
2
affiliated to any outside organization or political party."
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1325
2. " " " 205, " 1330
I
This clause was included because at the time of the general *°
stride seven Civil Service organizations were affiliated with the
Trade Unions Congress. One of these organizations had sent a
circular stating that the three largest of the Civil Service
organizations had declared themselves willing to place their powers
in the hands of the General Council of the T . U. C. in regard to
1
(1) calling a strike of their members, and f2) financial aid.
Clause 6 prohibited any public authority from requiring that
2
employees should be trade union members. It also provided that
employees of local authorities performing duties vital to the
3
community should not be allowed to break their contracts of service.
Clause 8 t excluded Rorthern Ireland from the scope of the Bill.
Sir Douglas Hogg concluded his speech by appealing for support
to the Labor members who did not approve the general strike, calling
on them to show the moral courage required to turn from the nuneom-
promising hostility f n which they had resolved upon even before hearing
the Bill. He scored the Liberals for their failure to support
the Bill, the general principles of which they approved, merely on the
grounds that the time was not expedient for introducing such a Bill.
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1331
2. n 20E, " 1333
3. n n 205, w 1334
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b. Principal speeches in debate on second reading
1. J. R. Clynes
J. R. Clynes, the temporary leader of the Opposition as Deputy
Chairman of the Labor Party, in answering the speech of the representa-
tive of the Government, called the Bill "a calculated and deliberate
1
piece of class hostility." The omission of reference to the lock-
out, he said, supported this view. The general strike could not be
accepted as the cause of this proposed legislation, as the Bill in-
cluded other matters than questions arising from the strike.
I'.r. Clynes' speech suggested the main lines which the criticism
would take. The vague definitions of sucn terms as "trade" and
"industry" were criticized. Intimidation on the part of employers
as well as workmen should be prevented. Too much power was given
the Attorney-General in deciding on the legality of strikes. A
"blackleg" should accept the majority decision as men in the professions
were obliged to do. Tne Civil Service employees, about half of wnom
received less than £3 a week, should not be regarded as a specially
privileged class and consequently should not be denied privileges
given other citizens. The political levy form in use was sufficient-
ly generous, as it gave the minority privileges not commonly granted und
the law of majority rule. Dissenting members were not oblie-ed to
contribute. Contracting- in would give no new rights, but would only
1. Official Report-, Vol. 205, Col. 1338
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hinder the trade unions in collective action for gathering tne
political levy.
According to Clynes the Bill, springing from "Class hostility
1
and political vindi ctiveness, " would ruin all chances for industrial
peace
•
(£) Harney
Tne first speaker for the Liberal Party, E. A. 3. Harney,
the member for South Shields, declared that the Bill was "believed
to be nothing less than the ungenerous, ignoble, and unworthy crow
of exultation on the part of the Government over a body of men
2
whom they believe they have defeated
.
w He opposed the omission
of lock-outs. He stressed the improbability of another general
strike, and stated that the Bill was in reality directed against
all strikes. Too much power was ?iven the Attorney-General by
Clause 7, The definition of intimidation was ridiculous. The
chief objection to contracting in was tnat the failure of members
to sign the required forms, from sheer inertia, would cause a
decrease in the political funds.
(3) Slesser
Sir Henry Slesser, tne Labor tarty 1 s chief autnority on legal
joined.
questions and Solicitor-General in 1924, in the attack upon the word-
ing of the Bill, and brought forth the view that the Bill would
place the workman in the position of a serf, as it would make it
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1351
2. " * 205, « 1353
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impossible for him to leave his work, in case of an illegal strike,
1
even after giving notice. As a result of the "wonderfully
vague" wording, which was capable of great misinterpretation, Slesser
declared the Bill dealt "a deadly blow at the whole process of
2
striking," and "so increased the risk and peril of picketing that
it has made picketing altogether impossible." The much criticized
power ?iven the Attorney-General, he said, was derived from ideas
coming from the United States and not from Moscow, but would be as
deadly to tae trade dispute as anything tnat ever came from Russia*
(4) F. H. Hose
Tne debate on Tuesday centered mainly on Clause 1, with
considerable discussion as to the amount of misinterpretation which
might arise from the vagueness of the wording and which might prevent
all strikes.
A rather facetious speech by F. H. Hose, a Labor member, illus-
trates the doubt held by many of the recurrence of a general strike.
He said, in part: "I c°nnot imagine anybody taking the general strike
as a basis for legislation. It was a senile decrepit when they
wheeled it out of Ecclestcn Souare in a bath-chair. It was dead in
twenty-four hours, and it was nothing but a corpse v.hen they paraded
it for the rest of the week, and, to all intents and purposes, it has
since been not only dead but damned. When I see a Government pass-
ing solemn legislation upon an episode like this in our industrial
1. Official Report, vol. 205, Col. 1374
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life, I marvel, and wnen I near Members of my own party talking
about tnat miserable fiasco as a dress rehearsal, as a precursor
to something better and more conclusive which may nappen some
other time, I have no words. . . . The mass of the working
1
men of this country, will not have another one."
(5) Sir John Simon
In the debate on Wednesday, the most important speakers were
Sir John Simon, who had defended the proposition that the general
strike was illegal, and Premier Baldwin.
Sir John Simon, the chief authority on legal questions of the
liberal Party, agreed with the four main purposes of the Bill as
presented by the Attorney-General. He criticized the Labor Party
for the uncompromising attitude which restrained them from improving
the Bill by presenting constructive amendments. The principal
criticisms offered by Sir Jonn Simon were concerned with tue vague-
ness of the lang-uase of the Bill and with the failure to deal with
lock-outs, which saould have been included for the psychological
effect if for no other reason.
(6) The Prime Minister
The Prime Minister's speech was somewhat delayed by interruptions
and b: the necessity of suspending a member for calling Mr. Baldwin
a liar. After this episode, Baldwin continued in an attempt to
Justify his change of policy in regard to introducing the Bill.
In the autumn of 1924, the Prime Minister stated, he had no
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, col. 1529-30
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intention of introducing any bill affecting trade unionism. In
1925 he opposed the Macquisten Political Levy Bill, although it
had the support of a majority in the Conservative Iarty, because
* *
"at a difficult time of industrial relations" he did not wish "to
1
be responsible for firing the first shot." Ine subsidy had
been granted in 1925 with this same purpose of preserving industrial
peace. "During and immediately after the general strike Mr. Baldwin
had been urged to pass a bill dealing with trade unions, but refused
because at that particular time it would probably have taken too
vindictive a form. The general strike, nowever, was tne justification
for tne 192 7 Bill.
(7) Philip Snowden
The speech of Philip Snowden, Chancellor of the Excheauer in 1924,
and a prominent Socialist, was a further attack on the ambiguities of
the Bill. In regard to the general strike he said: "Although the
general strike, in my opinion, is always ineffective as an industrial
weapon, yet it is not wrong. The argument against the general strike
is not that it is wrong, the argument is, in my opinion, tnat it is
2
a foolish and ineffective weapon to use." The mere passing of
legislation would never stop a general strike if the workmen were
resolved to nave one. The clause on intimidation he treated with
considerable scorn.
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1666
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(8) Lloyd George
Lloyd George, former Prime Minister and leader of tne Liberal
Party, attacked tne Bill on tne basis of inexpediency. "Every
argument drawn from the failure of tne general strike is an
1
argument for proceeding with the work of conciliation." He also
declared no legislative act could prevent or stop a general strike
upon which the workers were determined,
c. Vote on second reading.
The vote on the second reading was one of the largest which had
been cast for several years, with 591 members participating. Some
members, of whom Sir John Simon was one, were present but did not vote.
The Conservative vote was cast solidly for the Bill, the Labor
vote solidly against it. The Liberals were divided, with nineteen
against the Bill and seven for it. The Government majority was E15.
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1813
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3. Committee stage
a. Adoption of closure ruling
The Bill was first considered in Committee on Lay 11. The
vast amount of work to he done soon appeared. It was announced
that forty-six pages of amendments had already been prepared, and
tne interest in remodelling Clause 1 alone threatened to replace
the cross-word puzzle fad.
A great deal of time was devoted to the Bill in the first days
of the Committee stage. Cn May 11 a debate of more than four hours
followed tne moving of the first amendment, and a debate begun after
eleven P. M. continued until half-past twelve. Another discussion,
begun before four on the afternoon of May 12 lasted until four o'clock
tne next morning. The Prime Minister, consequently, presented a time
schedule on May 16, limiting the Committee stage to twelve allotted
days, each with a definite time for closure, and allotting three days
to the Report stage, and one to the Tnird Reading. At the close of
the given time on each day of the Committee stage the question before
the Committee should be put to a vote, and any amendments, new clauses,
or schedules proposed by the Government and of which notice had been
given should also be voted upon. This time schedule was adooted by
1
a vote of 259 to 13.
1. Official Report, Vol. 206, Col. 952
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b. Nature of amendments proposed by Labor and. Liberal members.
The Labor members handed in over 200 amendments, practically
all of which were destructive in character, following the campaign
mapped out by the Labor rarty from the time of the introduction of
the Bill.
When Clause 1 was considered by the Committee, Sir Henry Slesser
moved that the words "For the purpose of removing doubts" be inserted
at the beginning:, on the ground that doubt existed as to whether the
clause was merely declaratory of the existing law. A long debate
ensued on the question of the legality of the general strike. Tne
amendment was not accepted.
An amendment proposed by Clynes, to limit the definition of
illegal strikes to strikes in breach of contract, likewise proved
unsuccessful
.
The principal Liberal amendment proposed to substitute Sir John
Simon's definition of illegal strike: "Notwithstanding anything in the
Trade Unions Acts, any combination, whether of employers or of persons
employed, the object of which is to coerce the Government or Parlia-
ment, as distinguished from furthering a trade dispute, by means of
concerted and simultaneous refusal to continue employment or work
1
is an unlawful conspiracy." This amendment was defeated by a vote
of 271 to 154.
The Labor and Liberal amendments to Clause 2 opposed the retro-
spective character of the clause.
1. Official Report, Vol. 806, Col. 663
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Clause 3 was attacked in a variety of ways. Labor members
proposed tne omission of the entire clause, or attempted to amend
it in such a way as to limit its application, or to penalize employers
for blacklisting, or employers or associations of employers attempting
to intimidate another employer. The Liberal amendments proposed to
limit the application of the word "injury" to physical injury.
The amendments offered by Labor members to Clause 4 dealt with the
time of coming- into operation of the new system of political levy,
the persons an3 unions to whom or to wnich it would apply, the method
of giving notice, and the time allowed for alteration of the union
rules. The Liberal amendments sought to make it clear that tne
declaration of willingness to subscribe need not be made eacnyear.
In Clause 5 also the Labor amendments were concerned with the
time of coming into operation, and the persons to whom tne clause
should apply. The Liberals aimed to exclude manual workers in
industrial employment under the Crown.
Clause 6 the Labor members would limit to the prohibition of
any condition tnat the employee must not be a trade union member.
Liberal and Labor members alike objected entirely to Clause 7.
None of the amendments proposed by Labor or Liberal members
were accepted, with tie exception of minor changes in Clause 4.
c. Government amendments adopted.
A general debate upon trie entire clause was permitted in almost
every case upon the moving of the first amendment to that clause.
This debate occupied so much time that many of the Government amend-
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ments were proposed at tne close of the allotted time under tne
closure rule and accordingly were put to a vote without discussion.
The most important Government amendments were those altering
Clauses 1 and 3. Tne Attorney -General wisely rectified the much-
criticized omission of the illegal lock-out. The wording of the
definition of the illegal strike was changed to remove the expression
"to intimidate the community or any substantial portion of the
community." The use of the word "intimidate" in this connection
had been criticised as vague.
The definition of illegal strike in the first draft had read:
"It is hereby declared that any strike having any object besides the
furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry in which
the strikers are engaged is an illegal strike if it is a stride
designed or calculated to coerce the Government, or to intimidate
the community or any substantial portion of the community, and that
it is illegal to commence, or continue, or to apply any sums in
1
furtherance or support of such a strike."
As amended, this portion read: "It is nereby declared tnat any
strike is illegal if it nas any object other than or in addition to
the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry
in which the strikers are engaged; and is a strike designed or
calculated to coerce the Government either directly or by inflicting
hardship upon the community; and that any lock-out is illegal if it
has any object other than or in addition to the furtherance of a
1. London Times, April 5, 1927
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trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the employers
locking-out are engaged; and is a lock-out designed or calculated to
coerce the Government either directly or by inflicting hard-ship
upon the community."
The term "trade or industry" was defined in the amended form of
Clause 1.
Tne definition of intimidation (Clause 3, sub-section (2)), which
had so aroused the mirth or the ire of the opponents of the Bill,
was modified by a Government amendment. The first form had read,
"In this section the expression "to intimidate" means to cause in the
mind of a person a reasonable apprehension of injury to him or to
any member of his family or of violence or damage to any person or
property, an<i the expression "injury" includes injury other than
physical or material injury, and accordingly tne expression "Apprehensio;
of injury" includes an apprehension of boycott, or loss of any kind,
1
or of exposure to hatred, ridicule, or contempt."
The Government moved the omission of tne words following
"physical or material injury."
In the Report stage the Government amended Clause 5 by the
addition of proviso (2), allowing any person employed by the Crown
who later becomes an established civil servant to remain a trade union
member. Suosection (£) Clause 6, was added, and definitions of "lock-
out" and "calculated to coerce" were inserted in Clause 8. Tne pro-
visions regarding civil servants were extended to apply to northern
Ireland.
1. London Times, April 5, 1927
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4. Third reading
The Bill ras brouerht up for the Third Heading on June 23,
It was evident that the Labor members had resolved not to go down
to defeat in silence. They questioned the necessity of the Bill,
criticized the way in which it ;.ad been handled in Parliament, and
predicted that its results would have an unfavorable reaction upon
the industrial situation. Their principal spokesman was Snowden,
who held the attention of the members for an hour by nis verbal
attack. upon tne .bill and its sponsers. He declared tnat tne Bill
would "remain a dead letter because tne spirit of public opinion
1
can never be breatned into it." The Bill, he said, "has no
democratic sanction. It has no moral sanction. Not only the
introduction of the Bill but the way in which it has been forced
through the House of Commons is an outrage upon Parliamentary
procedure. Tne Government professes to be aiming at maintaining
constitutional government. No greater blow has been struck in
this generation at constitutional government than the introduction
1
of this Bill." It was, in snort, a "vicious, malignant,
1
provocative Bill. "
Cne member of the Labor Party resorted to the less dignified
tactics employed at the time of tne Second Heading, and was suspended
for referring to the Attorney-General as a liar.
1. Official Report, Vol. 207, Col. 2159
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Sir John Simon believed that even in its final form the Bill
would be difficult to interpret, but nevertheless considered i t so
much improved that at last he stated his intention of voting for it.
The lack of public feeling against the Bill, he argued, indicated
that the oeople felt a desire to have the law clarified by the Bill.
He referred to Snowmen's speech on the interest of a third party,
1
the community, in industrial disputes. He concluded by saying
that he did not believe the Bill subversive to tne cause of peace.
The Solicitor-General was in a very enviable frame of mind
in regard to the Bill. He said in part: "On the whole, the Bill
2
appears to be a better Bill even than wnen it was introduced. .
The more one studies this Bill, the more one comes to tne view tnat
it will provide for trie liberties of tne people. In commending
this Bill to the House, I can say with sincerity that when one
realizes its object it is no wonder tnat it is being more and more
accepted with, a quiet and sincere welcome by the people for wnom
3
we are trustees."
The Solicitor-General's trust was justified so far as the House
of Commons was concerned, for a crowded, cheering, and cneerful House
4
sped the Bill on its way by 354 votes to 139."
1. Official Report, Vol. 207, Col. 2110
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C. Principal points at issue
1. Declaratory nature of Clause 1, Sub-section (1)
Clause 1 of the Bill, dealing with illegal strikes, caused the
greatest amount of discussion and created a wide diversity of opinion
Tne first point raised was whether or not Sub-section (1), defining
tne illegal strike, was merely declaratory of the existing law.
The Attorney-General, in presenting the Bill for the Second
1
Heading, declared tnat this sub- section was purely declaratory,
basing this statement upon the judgment given by Justice Astbury
in the case of the national Sailors' and Firemen's Union of Great
Britain and Ireland v. G. Reed and Others, In this decision,
given May 11, 1926, Justice Astbury had said: "This so-called
general strike called by the Trade Unions Congress is illegal and
2
contrary to law."
Harney (Lib.) declared tnat the sub-section defining the illegal
strike was contrary to both statutory and common law. He said:
n It is not a declaration of the law. . . The existing law, under the
Act of 1906, provides that men can strike in the primary or all the
secondary industries and even break their contracts by doing so,
and still the funds of the union are immune and the persons of the
strikers are safe. . . . Wipe out the 1906 law, and wnat do you
find? You nave common law for centuries - with a slignt break
1. Official Report, Vol. 805 » Col. 1307
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between 1799 and some years afterwards when a panicky Act of
Parliament was passed - you have the common law for centuries
saying, 'Let any man do a thing that is lawful and it cannot be
made unlawful because 10,000, 20,000, or 1,000,000 otner men do
the same thing.' That is the common law of England, and it is
1
common justice." Harney also stated that tne Bill would
2
undo the Act of 1875.
Sir John Simcn, having already declared the general strike
illegal, naturally agreed in the declaratory nature of this section.
On this point he was at variance with the other members of his party.
Sir Henry Slesser, the principal spokesman of the Labor Party
on questions of legality, believed this Bill overturned the existing
law. "For hundreds of years," he said, "the law of this country
has been that employers and employed were alike able, by giving
notice under their contracts, to terminate their engagements the one
with the otner .... Under this Bill .... it will no longer be
within the power of a workman, except at the expense of becoming a
3
criminal, to terminate his contract. "
The most important debate on tnis subject followed Slesser 1 s
proposal, on May 11, to insert the words: "For tne purpose of
removing doubts." Slesser's speech emphatically denied tne illegali
of the general strike. He said: "The Measure, so far from being
declaratory of any existing law, is overturning and altering the
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1358-59
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existing law with regard to the rights of strikers and trade unionists
which have existed for the last 100 years. . . The existing law
declares that men have a right to terminate their contracts
You are withdrawing from all the working people of this country the
1
right to terminate their contracts in concert."
Slesser cited the Erskine judgment of 1843 tnat a strike for
increased wages was not illegal, nor any agreement among men to support
2
each other in order to obtain any lawful aim. Tnat the aim of the
1926 strike was lawful was indicated by the Prime Minister's statement
3
in the House that it was not seditious in intention.
Sir John Simon's view that the auesticn of illegality did not
turn on breach of contract, slesser declared, was not supported by any
3
other lawyer.
The Astbury decision could not be cited for three reasons:
(1) It was given in a case for an interim injunction, not as a
final determination of a legal point.
(2) The defendant was not represented by counsel and no precedents
were cited.
(3) The case turned on the small point whether tnis particular
4
contention did or did not come under the Trade Disputes Act.
1. Official Report, Vol. 206, Col. 4j7-S
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The Attorney-General, in reply to Slesser, said that the
Erskine Judgment had not been quo tec! exactly. He ouoted the
decision of the queen's Bench on the same case brought on appeal,
which says: "It is clearly illegal for persons to compel others
throughout the whole country to abstain from work until the charter
1
becomes the law of the land."
The Astbury Judgment, according to Hogg, would stand unless
2
reversed in the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords, as an
interlocutory judgment is given with great care and may be regarded
3
as a statement of the law.
Sir John Simon restated his opinion that the question of the
legality of the general strike turned on the fact that it was not
4
solely concerned witn a trade dispute.
2. Type of strike made illegal by Clause 1
Another problem arising from the discussion of Clause 1 was
concerned with the interpretation which might be placed upon it.
Some argued that it might be interpreted to cover sympathetic strikes
or even to make all strikes illegal.
Sidney ^ebb brought forward the unique view tnat tne original
form would not apply to the general strike. The general strike he
defined as "a strike wnich is not a trade dispute and not in fur the r-
5
ance of a trade dispute."
1. Official Report, Vol. 206, Col. 421
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The wording of the Clause, "having any object besides the furtherance
of a trade dispute," would imply the existence of a trade dispute.
The Government amendment, nowever, substituting for "besides" the
words "other than or in addition to", removed this ambiguity.
Other Labor members feared that Clause 1 would seriously
interfere with the right to carry on any strike. Kany of them spoke
at some length and with considerable feeling upon the subject.
Clynes said: "Our main objection to the first clause of this
Bill is that it will erect a great, if not an insuperable, barrier
of uncertainty and doubt in the minds of trade union leaders and
1
executives as to when it will be legal for them to take any action."
Walsh, a trade union member, said: "No possible strike can take
2
place that would not be brought within the scope of this Bill."
A. Henderson developed the point that the present condition of
industry, bound into amalgamations, combines, federations, etc., would
be undermined by a law limiting a strike to a single trade or industry.
Sucn amalgamations and combinations have been encouraged by Government
legislation, but their position under this Bill would be precarious.
3
The sympathetic strike was threatened by the first clause.
Another phase was discussed by Thomas. Some industrial changes,
he said, can be secured only by passing laws. Workmen, not realizing
this, may strike for these changes, thus placing themselves in the
position of coercing the Government. The magistrates, moreover, might
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1343
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interpret any sympathetic strike as injuring a substantial portion
1
of the community,
Slesser again was the most forceful speaker on the Labor side.
He made some rather sweeping statements in his speeches. "It is
quite clear what is in the mind of the Government. The Government
wish to prevent by law sympathetic strikes on a large scale or on a
small scale. They say it does not matter whether the strike has
anything to do with an intention to injure the State if they can say
it is inevitable that it will injure the community. ... We now
know that whatever the intention of the strikers may be is immaterial.
If what they do in the course of their ordinary industrial right is,
in fact, liable to inflict hardship on the community, it constitutes
an illegal strike within the meaning of this Bill. It is true, as
we have always declared, that what is hit at here is the ordinary,
2
normal, sympathetic strike."
There is danger, according to Slesser, that the leaders of the
striking men might do something which would make the strike illegal.
The strikers then would be engaged in an illegal strike, possibly
without their knowledge. The workmen would probably not understand
how Clause 7 operates to enable them to determine wnether a strike
3
is legal or illegal.
"In the future under this Bill it will be unsafe for men to take
part in any sympathetic strike whatever except at the risk of receiving
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1873-74
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two years' imprisonment As a matter of fact this Bill
1
deals a deadly blow at the whole process of striking."
Sir John Simon said that the sympathetic strike would not be
affected unless it satisfied the second condition of the definition,
by coercing the Government or the community. He seemed to think
that there was little danger that many sympathetic strikes would
2
be held illegal.
Other members of the Liberal Party were less optimistic. Harney,
3
for example, said: "It hits the justifiable and industrial strike."
He showed how the coal strike might have been brought under the
definition of illegal strike. One of its objects was the continuance
of the subsidy, which would not be considered a trade dispute* The
strike might also be considered an attempt to coerce the Government.
Practically any strike, Harney said, could be interpreted as illegal
under this definition. "This Bill is not a Bill directed against
general strikes, or even against extended sympathetic strikes. It is
4
a Bill directed against all strikes."
Lloyd George expressed a very similar opinion, and also gave ex-
amples to show how various types of strike might be interpreted as
illegal.
Sidney '.'.'ebb noted with some amusement that members of the
Conservative Party were not entirely in accord on the interpretation
of the Clause.
1. Official Eeport, Vol. 205, Col. 1380-81
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The Attorney-General insisted that the right to strike had
been preserved with care. "The sympathetic strike remains under
this Bill perfectly legal, so long as it i s a strike directed
against the employer and not directed against the Government or
1
the community."
Sir Gerald Hohler, on the contrary, said, "There is no right
to mat is called a sympathetic strike unless it is a sympathetic
2
strike within the trade or industry involved."
The only fact of which taere seemed to be no doubt was tnat
Clause 1 was difficult to interpret.
3. Extent to which Clause 3 would interfere with the conduct of
strikes.
Another clause upon which there was a great difference of
opinion was Clause 3, dealing with intimidation. The principal
objection to this clause was that by enlarging so vastly the
application of the word "intimidation" the conduct of any strike
would be very seriously hampered. This clause applies to all
strikes, legal or illegal.
The first sub-section, according to the Attorney -General, was
merely declaratory of the existing law as expressed in Section 2 of
the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1315
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This law, permitting peaceful picketing, nad been "honestly mis-
understood" and had been cited to cover many acts of intimidation
done by pickets. Hence a reaffirmation of the law in more definite
form was considered advisable. Sub-sections (2) and (3), however,
were new, as intimidation, formerly understood as a threat of
personal violence, was now extended to cover the acts calculated to
cause apprehension of injury other than physical or material injury.
Clynes in reply to the Attorney-General stated that intimidation
on the part of the employers was a much more serious wrong than any-
thing the workmen were apt to do and for more deserving of restrictive
legislation.
The general attitude, however, of the opponents was ridicule
of the idea that intimidation of the sort tiie Government was aiming
at could possibly be suppressed. Harney said: "The Attorney-
General thinks that though the policeman cannot prevent booing,
he can prevent this new intimidation, grimacing. Though he cannot
catch those who jeer and use bad language, he will catch those who
give a Llarie Lloyd twist to the eye or a Charlie Chaplin tilt to
the hat. Intimidation is extended from its dictionary meaning
into the regions of metaphysics.
J. Bromley, a trade unionist, said tnat if the Government
2
wording should pass, "we shall all be in gaol:"
1. Official Report, Vol. 20 5, Col. 1360
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Snowden joined in the general attitude of contempt for this
section of the Bill, saying that "nothing more ridiculous nas ever
been proposed in Parliament." The Bill, he said, introduced
"a new offence - the apprehension of being nel d up to ridicule.
If it is to be made an offence even to hold up a person to
ridicule, then the whole spice and enjoyment of life have been
1
taken away."
Wheatley, striking a more serious note, declared intimidation
justifiable as the means of enforcing workmen to abide by a
2
majority rule in time of strike.
Slesser believed the probable consequence of tnis clause would
be absolute impossibility of picketing, since any picketing might
cause apprenension of injury. Even the most peaceful picketing
might cause a man to fear tnat if he did not join the strike the
3
cause might be defeated and his wages reduced as a result. Even
the communication of information would become a criminal offense
if it might be shown to cause apprehension of injury. The Bill
would do away with rignts gained by tne trade unions in the Acts
4
of 1875 and of 1906.
Sir John Simon, nowever, again came to the support of tne
Government, saying tnat in the main Clause 3 merely declared the
existing law, which had been misunderstood and which needed to be
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1797
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1
clearly restated.
In the Committee stage, which was marked by attempts to
remove the entire clause from the Bill, some amusing- examples
were driven by Labor members of the lengths to which interpretation
of this clause might presumably be carried. J. H. Thomas, for
example, imagined a case in which tne wife of a striker mignt commit
2
an illegal act by refusing to invite to tea tne wife of a "blackleg."
T. Williams said tnat even under the existing laws some men had
been sent to prison for sitting and besettin g when they had been
merely sitting on their doorsteps and playing mouth-organs to amuse
3
themselves. What would be tne fate of these men if Clause 3 should
be passed?
Tne Government
,
perhaps moved by "exposure to ridicule," at
length offered an amendment removing the words: "and accordingly
4
the expression apprehension of injury includes an apprehension of
boycott, or loss of any kind, or of exposure to hatred, ridicule
t
4
or contempt," but left the words which Slesser declared the root
of the matter; "to csuse in the mind of a person a reasonable
5
apprehension of injury to him or any member of his family."
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4. Effect of Clause 4 (Political Levy)
Clause 4, dealing with the political levy, purported to be
a measure designed to protect unwilling trade unionists from
being forced to contribute to the political fund. The opposi-
tion, however, regarded it as a deliberate attempt to weaken the
political power of trade unions by decreasing their political funds.
The Att or ney-General in presenting the clause stated that under
the existing law many had found themselves practically compelled
1
to subscribe to the levy. Another member of the Government,
the Secretary of State for War, quoted figures to indicate that
under the 1913 Act not all of those dissenting to the political
levy were exempt. Of the 578,000 voting against setting up a
political levy, only 110,000 had asked for exemption. This would
indicate, he declared, that nearly 500,000 who were unwilling were
2
practically compelled to pay. (This is the statement wnicn
grieved a member of the Labor Party so bitterly that ne was led to
announce that certain members of the Government could outdo Ananias.
Clynes vigorously denied that the existing method withheld
any rights from the union members, stating that on the contrary-
it went so far in protecting the rights of the individual that
it actually violated the principle of majority rule, as the minority
voting against the political levy were privileged to ask exenption
from paying. "T7e make ample provision for the man who wishes to
dissent Contracting- in will give no right whatever.
1. Official Peport, Vol. 205, Col. 1325
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That right has always existed. It is a process for destroying
anything: answering to collective action for gathering working-
1
class contributions for political purposes. n
Sir Henry Slesser also condemned the clause for giving no
new right, but destroying the right of the unions to raise funds
2
for political objects.
Harney aimed at the weak point in Hogg's argument tnat if
no one was being forced unwillingly to pay, tne dill would not
diminish the political funds of the trade unions. r2ae new method,
calling for definite action on the part of those who were willing
to subscribe, would be a less efficient method because mere inertia
would prevent many from taking the trouble to send in their notice
3
of willingness to pay,
Mr. Spencer, the unintimidated trade unionist, regarded as the
final straw the provision requiring the men to deliver their notices
4
of willingness to contribute. Human nature usually objects to
making: n on-compulsory returns which require the application of a
postage stamp and deposit in a letter-box.
The Labor members seized with avidity upon tne answer given by
the Labor Minister on April 28 to a Question about tne number of
complaints under tne method of contracting out during the year
1. Official Report, Vol. 205 , Col. 1350
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ending Mar. 31, 1927, There had been only thirteen complaints,
1
seven of which were justified and one held in abeyance.
Snowden raised the question of how the Prime Minister could
claim that the general strike justified the inclusion of a
2
political levy clause. Baldwin's speech had made a wide
circuit around that point. It would have been interesting had
he attemrted to justify the inclusion of the clause, especially
as he had previously opposed the Macquisten Political Levy Bill.
J. H. Thomas attempted to show the relation between tne general
strike and the political levy clause. This explanation is probably
not the one which Baldwin would nave given before tee House. The
trade union leaders for the most part, said Thomas, agreed tnat the
general strike was a failure and would not be attempted again.
Instead, political action in the House of Commons would be resorted
to for obtaining reforms. The Government, realizing this, was
now attempting to cripple the political power of the unions by
3
decreasing their funds.
Several labor members dwelt on the point that if any trade
union members had been forced to pay unwillingly under the existing
system, the same pressure might be applied under the method of
contracting in. It would merely be necessary to note who failed
1. Official Report, Vol. 205, Col. 1010
2. " " " 205, 1798
3. " 205, " 1875
c
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to contract in instead of who contracted out. The evil, if it
} existed, would not be removed by the Bill.
D The Bill in the House of Lords.
The Bill passed the Plouse of Lorc".s with little difficulty.
It was reported for the S'irst Heading on June 24. The Second
Reading was moved by the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Cave, on
June 30. A two-hour debate followed Viscount Haldane's motion of
rejection. The debate was continued on July 4 and 5. The motion
c the Second Readi: passed on July 5 by a vote of 152 to
26. In the Committee Stage the Bill was discussed on four days.
No significant amendments were passed. The Third Reading was
passed July 25, by a vote of 36 to 17, and on July 29 the Bill
received the Royal Assent.
9
1r-
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IV. Some conclusions drawn from a study of the Bill
A. Necessity of certain clauses doubtful
1. Clauses 1 and 2
A study of the Bill leads to tne conclusion tnat tne necessity
of certain of the clauses is in doubt.
Clauses 1 and £, dealing with illegal strikes and lock-outs
and protection of persons refusing to take part in illegal strikes
and lock-outs, might be of value if there was any great danger of
the occurrence of such strikes or lock-outs. Such protection from
a general lock-cut seems rather unnecessary. No general lock-out
has ever been attempted, and the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 had
already given tne Government power to deal with any which might
occur.
The principal aim of the clause, however, as stated by the
Attorney-General, is the prevention of another general strike. But
the general strike of 1926 was without question an absolute failure.
Not even the most radical of trade union leaders claim that it met
with the slightest degree of success. Only the most radical
predict that it will be attempted again. MacDonald, Snow den, ani
other Labor leaders of their type, frankly admitted that tne futility
of tne general strike as an industrial weapon had been demonstrated
beyond question. 7/ith the recurrence of the general strike so
highly improbable, the necessity of legislation guarding against it
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is extremely doubtful.
2. Clause 3.
The necessity of Clause 3, dealing with intimidation, is also
in doubt. The existing laws provided penalties for intimidation
by threat of material or physical damage. This clause merely
extends the application of the term intimidation to cover the
threat of injury "otner than physical or material injury."
In the discussion in the House of Commons upon the question of
intimidation, practically all of t he examples given of cases of
intimidation were acts which were dealt with by the existing laws,
that is, intimidation by threat of physical or material injury.
If the other type of intimidation was generally employed, it seems
probable that its effect upon the workmen was not devastating.
The existing laws were probably sufficient to deal with the cases of
intimidation which would be most seriously regarded bj the victims.
3. Clause 4
The change in the system of political levy r.ould be necessary
only if serious abuses existed under the system of contracting out.
The Government failed to prove that this was the case. Ho definite
statistics were given to indicate that many union members were forced
to contribute unwillingly. On the contrary, the Government was
forced to admit that in a year only seven cases of unwilling sub-

scriptions could be shown. Moreover, the new system did not
remove all possibility of forcing union members to contribute
the levy against their will.
f
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B. Definitions open to misinterpretation
1. Illegal strike
The Attorney-General claimed that tne definition of illegal
" strike as given in Clause 1 would not apply to the ordinary sym-
pathetic strike.
To be illegal a strike much satisfy two conditions. It must
have an object "other taan or in addition to the furtherance of a
trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the strikers are
engaged." It must also be "designee! or calculated to coerce the
Government either directly or by inflicting hardship upon the
community.
"
Practically any strike might be interpreted as inflicting nard-
ship upon the community. The decisive condition, then, is the first.
Any sympathetic strike would satisfy this condition if it involved
strikers in more than one trade or industry* It seems apparent that
many sympathetic strikes might be judged illegal under tnis clause.
2. Intimidation.
In Clause 3 tne vague wording of tne definition of intimidation
gives rise to difficulties. The problem of how a man could prove
in court that he had experienced a reasonable apprehension of injury
other than material or physical injury is an interesting one. Exactly
^ what constitutes such injury is an open question and would probably
be interpreted in many different ways by different magistrates. The
trade unionist, if he wishes to choose his actions so as to avoid all
danger of being accused of intimidation, will find himself compelled

to remain practically inactive.
The assurances of the Government that tnese clauses will not
be misinterpreted are of little value, for the Government cannot
guarantee the decisions of all the courts under whicn cases might
at any time be brought.

C. Possibility of regarding the .dill as a declaration of class
war.
1. Failure to invite co-operation of Labor leaders.
Those who choose to regard the Bill as a declaration of class
war can make out a ratner good case. The first charge against the
Government is its failure to invite the co-operation of the Labor
leaders in preparing the Bill* The Committee which investigated
conditions was composed entirely of Conservatives. Labor members,
if invited to participate, might have contributed valuable suggestions.
Failure to ask their aid made the Bill definitely a party issue and
possibly a class issue.
2. Conditions under which the Bill was introduced.
The Bill was introduced at a time when many of the trade unions
were losing members and facing bankruptcy as a result of the fiasco
of 19S6. The coal strike had been completely broken; the general
strike was an entire failure. The time seemed ripe for measures
of conciliation, possibly for some plan, worked out in a non-partisan
conference, which would make arbitration a more effective means of
avoiding industrial conflict in the future. Instead, without definite
warning and without much explanation the Government presented the
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill.
The trade union leaders regarded tne Bill as a blow to the
defeated; as an unfair advantage taken when they were unable to fight
back.
3. Particular clauses considered indicative of class hostility.
Certain clauses of the Bill lend color to the theory that the
whole thing is an expression of class hostility. Clause 1, possibly
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to be interpretat ed as preventing sympathetic strikes, anri Clause
3 creating- a ne^7 form of intimidation wnich might seriously interfere
with all picketing, are regarded by many as definite attempts to take
away from the unions the effective use of the strike as a weapon.
The clause dealing with the political levy nas been considered a
deliberate effort to cripple the political power of the unions.
The Attorney -General gave the general strike as the justification
for the Bill. Certain trade union leaders professed to see no
justification in the general strike for the inclusion of the clauses
dealing with intimidation and with the political levy.
4. Industrial peace threatened by this interpretation of the Bill.
Whether or not the Bill may be justly regarded as a declaration
of class war, the mere fact that such an interpretation may be placed
upon it by many trade union leaders is a threat to industrial peace.
The more aggressive will consider it as a challenge and will be con-
stantly on the alert for opportunities to reply to it. Those who
believe that the main points of the Bill were dictated by the employer
class will seek retaliation in the ways remaining open to them.
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V. Summary
The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill of 1927 followed a series
of legislative acts which since 1871 had been increasing the power
and security of the trade union movement. Tne Acts of 1871 and of
1875-76 gave the unions legal recognition and assured the rignt to
strike. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 expressly permitted peaceful
picketing and prohibited suing the unions for damages arising from
tortious acts done by or on behalf of the unions. The Trade Unions
Act of 1913 permitted any union with a majority in favor to collect
a political levy. Members unwilling to pay might ask exemption.
The increasing number of trade union representatives in Parliament
facilitated the passage of legislation favorable to the unions. A
majority of the Labor members were trade unionists.
The precipitating- causes of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions
Bill were the coal strike of 1925 and the general strike of 1926.
The coal dispute arose over a proposed reduction of the wage scale
When a general strike in support of the miners was threatened in 1925,
tne Government granted a subsidy to prevent immediate reduction of pay
and appointed a commission to investigate the situation. The report
of tne commission, publisned in March, 1927
,
was accepted by the
Government and the mine owners, but not by tne miners.
A notice of reduced wages to go into effect May 1 brought the
miners out on strike. l!he General Council of the Trade Unions Congres
taking over the conduct of the dispute, called the general strike,
stating that it was a strike purely in furtherance of a trade dispute.
t
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The strike lasted nine days and ended in failure, due largely to the
effectiveness cf volunteer labor.
Sir Jchn Simon considered the strike illegal as it involved an
m attempt to coerce the Government. He quoted a decisi on by Justice
Astbury in support of this view. Sir Henry Slesser supported tne
legality of the general strike.
The miners' strike ended in failure and the trade unions in
general suffered as a result of the general strike.
The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Bill was drawn up wholly
by Conservatives and supported by the Prime Minister, who had given
up his previous unwillingness to introduce a bill dealing with trade
unions. The publication of the text of the Bill resulted in a
declaration by the Labor leaders of their intention to fight it un-
reservedly •
The Attorney-General, in presenting the Bill for the Second
Heading, declared that it defended four propositions: (1) Tne general
strike is illegal and no one should be penalized for refusing to
participate in it. (2) Intimidation is illegal. (3) Eo one should be
forced to contribute unwillingly to a levy for political purposes.
(4) Persons entering the Civil Service should give their undivided
allegiance to tne state.
The principal points of attack by the opposition were Clause 1,
dealing with illegal strikes, Clause 3, on intimidation, and Clause 4,
which substituted the metnod of political levy known as contracting out
for the existing metnod.
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Clause 1 it was claimed was not declaratory of the existing law,
as tne general strike was not illegal. Sir Jonn Simon took the side
of the Government on this point, opposing Sir Henry Slesser, the
principal spokesman of the Labor Party on this question.
It was argued, moreover, that Clause 1 might be so interpreted as
to make many types of strike illegal besides the so-called general strike.
Tne Labor members claimed that Clause 3, by widening tne definition
of intimidation, would tend to interfere seriously witn the conduct
of all strikes.
The political levy clause required all union members willing to
subscribe to hand in written notice to that effect. The Labor members
argued that this method would interfere with any collective action in
gathering tne political levy, that many wno were willing to subscribe
would be unwilling to take tne trouble to turn in their notices, tnat
the cnange was unnecessary as no serious misuses of tne existing systen
could be proved, and that the new nietnod would not destroy the
possibility of forcing unwilling subscriptions.
The vagueness of the definitions in the Bill and the failure to
include illegal lock-outs were severely criticized. The most important
of the Government amendments made in the Committee stage were the in-
clusion of the illegal lock-out and an alteration of the definitions
of intimidation and of illegal strikes. Wo very constructive amendments
were proposed by the Labor Party.
The Bill was passed on June 23 by a vote of 354 to 139.
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The necessity of the Bill is doubtful, as the failure of •
the general strike made its recurrence improbable, as no serious
abuses of tne "contracting out" metnod of political levy could
be proved, and as laws on intimidation already in existence covered
the more serious forms.
The Bill might easily be interpreted as an expression of class
hostility. The Labor Party had no share in preparing it. It
was introduced at a time when the power of the trade unions seemed
to be waning. The general strike seemed no justification for
introducing the clauses on the political levy and on intimidation,
which some considered definite attacks on the power of the unions.
Since the Bill lends itself to this interpretation its effect upon
industrial peace will probably be injurious.
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APPENDIX
TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS BILL
(As Amended in Committee and on Report)
June 22, 1927
Declare and amend the law relating to trade disputes and A. D. 1927
trade unions, to regulate the position of civil servants
and persons employed by public authorities in respect of
membership of trade unions and. similar organisations, to
extend section five of the Conspiracy and Protection of
property Act, 1875, and for other purposes connected with
the purposes aforesaid.
Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled,
and by the authority of the same, as f ollows: -
1. (1) It is hereby declared -
(a) that any strike is illegal if it -
(i) has any object other than or in addition to
the furtherance of a trade dispute within the
trade or industry in which the strikers are en-
gaged; and
(ii) is a strike designed or calculated to
coerce the Government either directly or by
inflicting hardship upon the community; and

(b) that any lock-out is illegal if it -
(i) has any object other than or in addition to
the furtherance of a trade dispute within the
trade or industry in which the employers lock-
ing-out are engaged; and
(ii) is a lock-out designed or calculated to
coerce the Government either directly or by in-
flicting hardship upon the community;
and it is further declared that it is illegal to commence, or
continue, or to apply any sums in furtherance or support of,
any such illegal strike or lock-out.
For the purposes of the foregoing provisions*
-
(a) a trade dispute shall not be deemed to be within a
trade or industry unless it is a dispute between employers
and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, in that trade
or industry, which is connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of the employment, or with the
conditions df labour, of persons in that trade or industry; and
(b) without prejudice to the generality of the expression
"trade or industry" workmen shall be deemed to be within the
same trade or industry if their wages or conditions of
employment are determined in accordance with the conclusions
of the same joint industrial council, conciliation board, or
other similar body, or in accordance with agreements made with
the same employer or group of employers.

(2) If any person declares, instigates, incites
others to take part in or otherwise acts in furtherance
of a strike or lock-out, declared by this Act to be
illegal, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a
fine not exceeding ten pounds or to imprisonment for
a term not exceeding three months, or on conviction on
indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years:
Provided that no person shall be deemed to have
committed an offence under this section or at common
lav/ by reason only of his having ceased work or refused
to continue to v/ork or to accept employment.
(3) Where any person is charged before any court with
an offence under this section no further proceedings
in respect thereof shall be taken against him without the
consent of the Attorney-General except such as the court A.D,
1927
may think necessary by remand (whether in custody or
on bail) or otherwise to secure the safe custody of the
person charged, but this subsection shall not apply to
Scotland, or to any prosecution instituted by or on
behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
(4) The provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, shall
not, nor shall the second proviso to subsection (1) of
section two of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, apply to
any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a strike
or lock-out which is by this Act declared to be illegal,
and any such act shall not be deemed for the purposes of
any enactment to be done in contemplation or furtherance

of a trade dispute.
2. (1) No person refusing to take part or to continue
to take part in any strike or lock-out which is by this
Act declared to be illegal, shall be, by reason of such Protection
of persons
refusal or by reason of any action taken by him under refusing
to take
this section, subject to expulsion from any trade union part in
illegal
or society, or to any fine or penalty, or to deprivation strikes
or lock-
of any right or benefit to which he or his legal personal outs.
representatives would otherwise be entitled, or liable
to be placed in any respect either directly or indirectly
under any disability or at any disadvantage as compared
with other members of the union or society, anything to
the contrary in the rules of a trade union or society
notwithstanding.
(2) No provisions of the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to
1917, limiting the proceedings which may be entertained
by any court, and nothing in the rules of a trade union
or society requiring the settlement of disputes in any
manner shall apply to any proceeding for enforcing any
right or exemption secured by this section, and in any
such proceeding the court may, in lieu of ordering a
person who has been expelled from membership of a trade
union or society to be restored to membership, order
that he be paid out of the funds of the trade union or
society such sum by way of compensation or damages as the
court thinks just
•

(3) As respects any strike or lock-out before the
passing of this Act but since the first day of May,
nineteen hundred and twenty-six, which, according to
the law as declared by this Act, was illegal, this
section shall have effect as if it had been in operation
when the strike or lock-out took place,
3« (1) It is hereby declared that it is unlawful for
one or more persons (whether acting on their own behalf
or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual
employer or firm, and notv/i thstanding that they may be
acting in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dis-
pute ) to attend at or near a house or place where a
person resides or works or happens to be, for the purpose
of obtaining or communicating information or of persuad-
ing or inducing any person to work or to abstain from
working, if they so attend in such numbers or otherwise
in such manner as to be calculated to intimidate any
person in that house or place, or to obstruct the approach
thereto or egress therefrom, or to lead to a breach of
the peace; and attending at or near any house or place
in such numbers or in such manner as is by this subsection
declared to be unlawful shall be deemed to be a watching
or besetting of that house or place v/ithin the meaning of
section seven of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property
Act, 1875.

(2) In this section the expression "to intimidate"
means to cause in the mind of a person a reasonable
apprehension of injury to him or to any member of his
• family or of violence or damage to any person or property,
and the expression "injury" includes injury other than
physical or material injury.
(3) In section seven of the Conspiracy and Protection
of Property Act, 1875, the expression "intimidate" shall
be construed as having the same meaning as in this section.
(4) Notwithstanding anything in any Act it shall not
be lawful for one or more persons, for the purpose of in-
ducing any person to work or to abstain from working, to
watch or beset a house or place where a person resides or
the approach to such a house or place, and any person v/ho
acts in contravention of this subsection shall be liable
on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months.
revisions 4. (1) It shall not be lawful to require any member of a
3 to politi-
il fund. trade union to make any contribution to the political fund
of a trade union unless he has at some time after the commence-
ment of this Act and before he is first thereafter required
to make such a contribution delivered at the head office or
some branch office of the trade union, notice in writing in
^ the form set out in the First Schedule to this Act of his
willingness to contribute to that fund and has not withdrawn
the notice in manner hereinafter provided, shall be deemed

for the purposes of the Trade Union Act, 1915, to be a
member who is exempt from the obligation to contribute
to the political fund of the union, and references in
that Act to a member who is so exempt shall be construed
accordingly:
Provided that, if at any time a member of a trade
union who has delivered such a notice as aforesaid gives
notice of withdrawal thereof, delivered at the head office
or at any branch office of the trade union, he shall be
deemed for the purposes of this subsection to have with-
drawn the notice as from the first day of January next
after the delivery of the notice of withdrawal.
For the purposes of this subsection a notice may be
delivered personally or by any authorised agent and any
notice shall be deemed to have been delivered at the head
or a branch office of a trade union if it has been sent by
post properly addressed to that office.
(2) All contributions to the political fund of a trade
union from members of the trade union who are liable to
contribute to that fund shall be levied and made separately
from any contributions to the other funds of the trade union
and no assets of the trade union, other than the amount raised
by such a separate levy as aforesaid, shall be carried to
that fund, and no assets of a trade union other than those
forming part of the political fund shall be directly or in-
directly applied or charged in furtherance of any political
object to which section three of the Trade Union Act, 1913,

applies; and any charge in contravention of this subsection
shall he void.
(3) All rules of a trade union made and approved in
accordance with the requirements of section three of the
Trade Union Act, 1913, shall be amended so as to conform
to the requirements of this Act, and as so amended shall be
approved by the Registrar of Friendly Societies (in this
Act referred to as "the Registrar") within six months after
the commencement of this Act or within such further time as
the Registrar may in special circumstances allow, and if the
rules of any trade union are not so amended and approved as
aforesaid they shall be deemed not to comply with the require-
ments of the said section.
(4) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, until the thirty-
first day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-seven, it
shall be lawful to require any member of a trade union to
contribute to the political fund of the trade union as if this
Act had not been passed.
(5) If the Registrar is satisfied, and certifies, that rules
for the purpose of complying with the provisions of this section,
or for the purposes of the Trade Union Act, 1913, as amended
by this Act, which require approval by the Registrar have been
approved by a majority of the members of a trade union voting
for the purpose, by the executive or other governing body of

such a trade union, or by a majority of delegates of such
a trade union voting at a meeting called for the purpose,
the Registrar may approve those rules and those rules shall
thereupon have effect as rules of the union notwithstanding
that the provisions of the rules of the union as to the
alteration of rules or the making of new rules have not been
complied with.
(6) Section sixteen of the Trade Union Act, 1871 (which
provides for the transmission to the Registrar of annual
returns by registered trade unions), shall apply to every
unregistered trade union so far as respects the receipts,
funds, effects, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the
political fund thereof,
5» (1) Amongst the regulations as to the conditions of
service in His Majesty's civil establishments there shall
be included regulations prohibiting established civil
servants from being members, delegates, or representatives
of any organisation of which the primary object is to
influence or affect the remuneration and conditions of em-
ployment of its members, unless the organisation is an
organisation of which the membership is confined to persons
employed by or under the Crown and is an organisation which
complies with such provisions as may be contained in the
regulations for securing that it is in all respects independent
of, and not affiliated to any such organisation as aforesaid
the membership of which is rot confined to persons employed by
or under the Crown or any federation comprising such organisations,

that its objects do not include political objects, and that it
is- not associated directly or indirectly with any political
party or organisation:
Provided that the regulations made in compliance with the
provisions of this section shall not prevent -
(a) any person who is at the commencement of this Act an
established civil servant from remaining a member of any trade
union or organisation not composed wholly or mainly of persons
employed by or under the Crown of which he had, at the commence-
ment of this Act, been a member for more than six months if
under the rules thereof there had on the fourth day of April,
nineteen hundred and twenty-seven, accrued or begun to accrue
to him a right to any future payment during incapacity, or by
way of superannuation, or on the death of himself or his wife, or
as provision for his children; or
(b) any person employed at the commencement of this Act by or
under the Grown who thereafter becomes an established civil
servant from remaining, so long as he is not appointed to
a position of supervision or management, a member of any trade
union or organisation, not composed wholly or mainly of persons
employed by or under the Crown, of which he is a member at the
date when he so becomes an established civil servant, if under
the rules thereof there has at that date accrued, or begun to
accrue, to him a right to any future payment during incapacity
or by way of superannuation, or on the death of himself or his
wife, or as provision for his children; or
(c) a person who in addition to being an established civil
servant is, apart from his service as such, also engaged in some

other employment or occupation from being a member, delegate, or
representative of any trade union or organisation, of which the
primary object is to influence or affect the remuneration or
conditions of employment of persons engaged in that employment
or occupation.
(2) If any established civil servant knowingly contravenes any of
the provisions of the said regulations he shall be disqualified
for continuing to be a member of the Civil Service,
(3) In this section -
(a) the expression "established civil servant" means a person
serving in an established capacity in the permanent service of the
Crown, and includes any person who, having been granted a certificate
by the Civil Service Commissioners, is serving a probationary period
preliminary to establishment; and
(b) the expression "conditions of employment" means in relation
to persons other than persons employed by or under the Crown the
conditions of employment of persons employed under a contract of
service
•
6* (1) It shall not be lawful for any local or other public authority
to make it a condition of the employment or continuance in employment
of any person that he shall or shall not be a member of a trade union,
or to impose any condition upon persons employed by the authority
whereby employees who are or who are not members of a trade union are
liable to be placed in any respect either directly or indirectly under
any disability or disadvantage as compared with other employees,
(2) It shall not be lawful for any local or other public authority
to make it a condition of any contract made or proposed to be made
with the authority, or of the consideration or acceptance of any
tender in connection with such a contract, that any person to be
TO « ~
employed by any party to the contract shall or shall not "be a
member of a trade union,
(3) Any condition imposed in contravention of this section
shall be void*
(4) There shall be added to section five of the Conspiracy
and Protection of Property Act, 1875, the f ollowing provision,
that is to say: -
"if any person employed by a local or other public authority
wilfully breaks a contract of service with that authority, know-
ing or having reasonable cause to believe that the probable
consequence of his so doing, either alone or in combination of
his so doing, either alone or in combination with others, will
be to hinder or prevent ttss discharge of the functions of the
authority, he shall be liable, on summary conviction, to a fine
not exceeding ten pounds or to imprisonment for a terra not
exceeding three months."
7. Without prejudice to the right of any person having a sufficient
interest in the relief sought to sue or apply for an injunction to
restrain any application of tie funds of a trade union in contra-
vention of the provisions of this Act, an injunction restraining
any application of the funds of a trade union in contravention of
the provisions of section one of this Act may be granted at the suit
or upon the application of the Attorney-General.
In the application of this section to Scotland there shall be
substituted therein for references to an injunction references to
an interdict, and for the reference to the Attorney-General a
reference to the Lord Advocate
.
8. (1) This Act may be cited as the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions
Act, 1927, and shall be construed as one with the Trade Union Acts,

1871 to 1917, and this Act and the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to
1917, may be cited together as the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to
1927.
(2) For the purposes of this Act -
(a) the expression "strike" means the cessation of
work by a body of persons employed in any trade
or industry acting in combination, or a concerted
refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding
of any number of persons who are, or have been s>
employed, to continue to work or to accept employ-
ment ;
(b)the expression "lock-out" means the closing of a
place of employment or the suspension of work, or
the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any
number of persons employed by him in consequence of
a dispute, done with a view to compelling those persons,
or to aid another employer in compelling persons em-
ployed by him, to accept terms or conditions of or
affecting employment; and
(c) a strike or lock-out shall not be deemed to be calculated
to coerce the Government unless such coercion ought
reasonably to be expected as a consequence thereof.
(3) This Act shall not extend to Northern Ireland, except that
the provision of this Act relating to civil servants shall apply
to civil servants employed in Northern Ireland in the administration
of services with respect to which the Parliament of Northern Ireland
has not power to m&e laws.
(4) The enactments mentioned in the Second Schedule to this Act
are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of
that schedule
.
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